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In past decades, we have witnessed an increasing economic status of the service 
sector in the US economy. American consumers spend more of their income on 
services, and the share of service employments in the economy also rises rapidly. 
As urban economists, what implications can we draw from this dramatic 
transformation of economic structure? In this thesis, we try to provide a few insights 
on this issue. 
 
We define a consumer city where residents cluster to share the agglomeration 
benefits of non-traded goods. We abstract from the agglomeration economics in the 
traded sector and assume there are increasing returns in non-traded service sector. 
The increasing returns can arise from preference for diversity of non-traded services 
or indivisibilities in production process. We try to provide a consumption-based 
theory of skill sorting across cities to explore how skill sorting interacts with 
welfare inequality. Also, we try to understand the internal structure of city of a 
consumer city and shed some lights on the efficiency issues. 
 
This thesis consists of two studies. The first study explores the emergence of 
"superstar cities". An important insight in Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5(4), 2013), that rising aggregate demand, 
rather than diverging local productivity, accounts for the widening house price 
dispersion across US cities after WWII, rests on the assumption of idiosyncratic 
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location preferences and asymmetric housing supply elasticity across cities. Under 
such assumptions, cities with inelastic housing supply are “superstar” cities—they 
get more expensive, hence more exclusive to high-income households, as aggregate 
demand increases. We sharpen and extend this insight by presenting a model where 
“superstar” cities emerge from the interaction between increasing returns to local 
demand for differentiated non-traded services and non-homothetic preferences, 
instead of idiosyncratic location preferences and asymmetric housing supply 
elasticity. We consider an economy with heterogeneous workers differentiated by 
skill level, who earn income from employment either in the traded-good sector, 
where worker productivity depends on skill but not location, or in the non-traded-
service sector, where worker’s wage depends on local demand but not skill. A fixed 
cost is required for each variety of local service, giving rise to increasing return to 
local demand, which is income elastic. In equilibrium, high-skill workers share the 
location with a greater variety of local services and higher land rent, middle-skill 
workers prefer the location with less variety of local services and lower land rent, 
low-skill workers, who specialize in non-traded sector, are indifferent between 
locations. The model can also account for skill dispersion within cities, rising non-
traded sector employment share, and a U-shaped welfare change across skill 
spectrum, as a result of increased skill disparity in the economy.  
 
The second study explores the internal structure and efficiency of consumer cities. 
In past decades, economic status of the non-traded service sector increased in the 
US. We build a model to study a consumer city, where consumers cluster to share 
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the positive externalities and fixed cost of non-traded services. We assume that the 
non-traded services are produced and consumed in a single central location, 
referred to as Central Commercial District, or CCD. This assumption captures 
positive externalities in non-traded service consumption, which arise from access 
to diversity by consumers when the services are concentrated in one location. 
Heterogeneous workers are differentiated by skill level, earn income from 
employment either in the traded-good sector or the non-traded service sector. 
Worker productivity in the former sector depends on skill but not location, whereas 
in the latter sector it depends on aggregate local demand but not skill. A fixed cost 
is required for the production of non-traded service, which rises with service quality, 
giving rise to increasing return to local demand. The preferences are non-
homothetic such that the demand for non-traded services is income elastic. We 
assume a single CCD landlord, who tenders the space out to a commercial service 
operator capable of paying the highest land rent. Service workers travel to work in 
the CCD and pay a commuting cost that linearly increases with distance to the CCD. 
Consumers visit the CCD to purchase non-traded services. On each trip, a consumer 
purchases one unit of service goods and pays a travel cost that linearly increases 
with distance to the CCD. In equilibrium, low-skill workers choose non-traded 
service occupation according to comparative advantage. High-skill traded-sector 
workers live in the central city to share the location with better access to non-traded 
services and higher housing price, low-skill service workers live adjacent to the 
central city, while middle-skill traded-sector workers live in the suburban region 
with the worst access to non-traded services and lowest housing price. The model 
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can also account for rising service quality, non-traded sector employment share, 
non-traded service expenditure share, housing price premium at the city center and 
a downward-sloping welfare change across skill spectrum, as a result of increased 
skill disparity in the city. 
 
One of the main objects of this study is to examine the efficiency of the consumer 
city. We find that maximizing commercial land rent in the CCD implies that the 
non-traded services are priced above the marginal production costs, hence, leading 
to a deadweight loss. Also, maximizing commercial land rent will cause 
inefficiency in resource allocation--the share of employments in the non-traded 
service sector is below social optimal and dispersed city structure generates more 
urban frictions. We argue that government should adopt the marginal-cost pricing 
regime by regulating the price of services and subsidizing the fixed costs changed 
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During past decades, big cities are gaining importance in offering consumption 
amenities. Recent literature documents the rise of "consumer cities", where the rich 
workers live in the central city, even though they work in suburbs. Demand for 
urban lifestyle has been increasing as a luxury good (Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, 
1999; Lee, 2010; Fu and Liao, 2012). When rich families cluster, it will create 
consumer externality effect such that high-quality local goods and services will 
appear to serve them. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) document that people value 
urban amenities more in year 2000, compared to year 1970 (Figure 1-1, Figure 1-2); 
big cities attract a larger population, because they provide high amenities (Figure 
1-3, Figure 1-4). 
 
The rise of “consumer cities” is likely to be fueled by demographic changes: smaller 
households, later marriages, decisions not to have babies, the emergence of a huge 
and active baby boom population in its sixties and seventies. All these changes 
generate more households who are willing to live in a smaller house in a central 
location to enjoy urban life.  
 
Although big cities are becoming the hubs for consumption amenities, some 
important research questions remain unanswered. In this thesis, we try to address 
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some of them: how does the rise of “consumer cities” affect people’s location 
choice across cities? How does it affect land use and urban structure? What are its 
implications for social welfare and inequality? How do fundamental factors, such 
as land supply, affect the rise of “consumer cities”? We contribute to the literature 
by focusing on the advantages of big cities in providing more diversified local 
service goods, while most of the previous studies only emphasize the advantage of 
big cities in improving productivity in manufacturing sector. 
 
We proceed in following way. In Chapter 2, we reviewed the literature most 
relevant to our studies and find the research gaps. In Chapter 3, we develop a theory 
on skill sorting across cities. In Chapter 4, we develop a theory on skill sorting 
within a consumer city. We conclude the whole thesis in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Log of real wages and city size, 1970 





Figure 1-2: Log of real wages and city size, 2000 
Source: Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Housing value changes and urban density, 1980-2000 
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Source: Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) 
 
 
Figure 1-4: Income growth and population density, 1990-2000 





2 Literature Review 
In this section, we review the strands of literature that are most relevant to our 
studies. We first review the literature that focuses on consumer cities. In our first 
study, we provide a consumption-based theory for skill sorting across metropolitan 
areas. We review the empirical literature to outline the key stylized facts associated 
with the economic status of cities, including patterns of skill sorting and housing 
price dispersion. Following that, we review the theoretical literature on skill sorting 
to identify the research gaps. In our second study, we build a monocentric city 
model to study the internal structure and resource allocation efficiency of a 
consumer city. Hence, we review the empirical literature that focuses on the 
economic status of neighborhoods within the city. Then, we review the theoretical 
studies that focus on Income-residential pattern within the city, most of which are 
also under the framework of monocentric city model. Also, there is a new strand of 
literature that explores the urban implications of endogenous interactions among 
agents. These studies emphasize the role of the city center as a place for non-market 
interactions. While we focus on market interactions in our second study, we realize 
that our study shares some similarities with the literature on certain main 
assumptions. At the end of literature review, we summarize the key insights that we 
draw from the literature. 
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2.1 Consumer Cities 
The rise of "consumer cities" 
Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) document the rise of "consumer cities" in US 
economy. The “consumer cities” are characterized by educated, wealthy people 
choosing to live downtown even when they work in the suburbs. The rise of 
"consumer city" is associated with gentrification at city center. In the 10 largest 
MSAs, incomes of the residents within one mile of CBD rose 19% relative to the 
MSA average over 1980-1990 and incomes of the residents between one and three 
miles from CBD rise 9% over the same period. The cities with more attractive 
consumption amenities, such as more restaurants and live performance theaters, 
have grown more quickly, from 1977 to 1995.   
 
Non-homothetic preference for consumption amenities 
Many studies show that the high-income workers appreciate consumption 
amenities more than the low-income workers do. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) find 
that the central-city residents with high education consume more local service 
goods than the suburban residents with low education. Adamson, Clark, and 
Partridge (2004) show that returns to education for the high-skill workers decline 
with the urban scale and interpret the finding as that urban amenities primarily 
affect the high-skill workers. Lee (2010) also shows that urban wage premium 
decreases with worker's skill and interpret it as evidence for that varieties of local 
goods is more valuable to high-skill workers. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) also 
notice that rents in US cities with more educated population have risen more 
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quickly than wages since the 1970s, and interpret this as that while productivity has 
gone up in places with more educated workers, the quality of life has risen even 
faster. In a recent study, Fu and Liao (2014) find that willingness to pay for non-
traded amenities increases with skill level, which is direct evidence that local 
consumption amenities are luxury goods. 
 
Urban economists use non-homothetic utility functions to model housing 
consumption behavior. The non-homothetic utility makes it possible for the cost-
of-living indices to vary across different income groups. Handbury (2013) 
estimates a non-homothetic utility function by using grocery data. The author 
argues that high-income households may find large cities to be more attractive 
because the large cities offer a wider range of groceries suited to the preference of 
the high-income. Albouy, Ehrlich and Liu (2015) also find the large cities are more 
attractive for the high-income because they spend a lower proportion of the income 
on housing.  
 
The high-skill workers improve job opportunities for the low-skill 
Other studies show that the presence of high-skill workers will improve 
employment outcomes for low-skill workers, especially for those employed in the 
non-traded service sector. In the context of US cities, Moretti (2010a) finds that 
each additional job in manufacturing sector generates 1.6 jobs in the non-traded 
sector in the same city. Also, the author finds that the local multiplier effect is even 
larger for skilled jobs, and one skilled job in the traded sector generates 2.5 jobs in 
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the non-traded sector. In the context of Swedish cities, Moretti and Thulin (2013) 
finds that the local multiplier effect is approximately of equal magnitude with that 
uncovered in U.S: adding 1 skilled job in the traded sector creates 3 new jobs in the 
non-traded sector. 
 
In the context of UK cities, Manning (2004) finds that the presence of retired 
educated workers raises the employment rate for unskilled workers. Because retired 
educated workers are unlikely to benefit the unskilled workers through knowledge 
spillover or any substitution effect in production, the author interprets the finding 
as that high-skill workers benefit the low-skill workers through raising demand for 
non-traded services. Also, the author also finds that the presence of high-skill 
workers in a city raises the share of low-skill workers in the non-traded sector but 
reduces the share in traded sector.  
 
Kaplanis (2010b) finds that the presence of high-paid occupation workers raises 
wage for low-paid occupation workers, but not for middle-paid occupation workers, 
and interpret this finding as that high-paid workers raise demand for the low-skill 
workers through increasing local demand for non-traded goods. In another study, 
Kaplanis (2010a) documents that the presence of degree holders will improve the 
employment rate for the local population. And this effect is especially strong for 





2.2 Empirical Evidence on Economic Status of Cities 
The widening dispersion in housing price across cities 
Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) documents a widening dispersion in housing 
price across metropolitan areas. They plot the kernel density of average annual real 
house price growth rate between 1950 and 2000 for 280 US MSAs, as shown in 
Figure 2-1. The real housing price growth rate ranges widely, from 0.2 percent to 
over 3.8 percent. As a result, the dispersion in housing price also becomes wider. 
By 2000, the housing price in the most expensive cities is four times of the national 
average, as opposed to twice in 1950, as shown in Figure 2-2.  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Density of 1950-2000 annualized real housing price growth rates 
across MSAs with 1950 population>50,000 




Figure 2-2: Density of mean house values across MSAs: 1950 vs. 2000 
Source: Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) 
 
The widening dispersion in skill composition across cities 
There are a growing number of empirical studies documenting that high-skill 
workers disproportionately sort in large cities (Bacolod, Blum, & Strange, 2009; 
Berry & Glaeser, 2005; S. Lee, 2010) and skill sorting accounts for a large fraction 
of urban wage premium (Baum-Snow & Pavan, 2012; Combes, Duranton, & 
Gobillon, 2008; Matano & Naticchioni, 2012). Also, this inequality of skill 
concentration was increasing in the past few decades (Fu & Liao, 2012) 
 
Blum and Strange (2009) find that large cities pay a higher reward for worker’s 
people skill and cognitive skill, while the reward for motor skill is no higher in the 
large cities. Matano and Naticchioni (2012) shows that agglomeration economies 
are stronger for individuals with high skill. Following the approach of Combes, 
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Duranton and Gobillon (2008), they assess the time- and location-invariant part of 
worker's wage and use it to measure worker's skill. They show that the wage effect 
of spatial externality is increasing along skill distribution. 
 
But, recent studies revealed that not only the most skilled but also the least skilled 
workers disproportionately sort in large cities. Eeckhout et al. (2014) are the first 
to document this stylized fact in the context of the US cities. Under the assumption 
that workers have Cobb-Douglas preference over a numéraire good and housing, 
the authors use wage, housing price and expenditure share of housing to calculate 
agent's utility. They use utility to measure individual's skill because the distribution 
of utility is isomorphic to the distribution of skills in a world with no market 
frictions. Their finding is robust to alternative measures of skill, e.g., educational 
qualifications and school years. In the context of French cities, Combes, Duranton, 
Gobillon and Roux (2012) also find a similar fat-tail skill distribution in the large 
cities. The authors follow the approach of Combes, Duranton, and Gobllon (2008) 
to assess the time- and location-invariant part of worker's wage, and then use it to 
measure worker's permanent skill. 
 
2.3 Theories of Skill Sorting across Cities 
Many theorists attempt to rationalize the observed patterns of skill sorting across 
cities. Most of them are successful in accounting for the pattern that high-skill 
workers disproportionately sort in large cities, but they neglect the stylized fact that 
12 
 
the low-skill also disproportionately sort in large cities. The researchers provide a 
range of production-based explanations and usually assume that the high-skill 
worker’s productivity can be improved disproportionately through agglomeration 
economy in traded good sector. Hence, their focus is on the different channels that 
high-skill worker's productivity can be improved. 
 
Skill-biased innovation 
Berry and Glaeser (2005) document an increasing concentration of the college 
degree holders in the large cities, over the 1990s. They argue that this trend is 
induced by inelastic housing supply and skill-biased innovation, featuring that 
high-skill workers tend to innovate in ways that employ the high-skill. 
 
They assume that high-skill and low-skill workers coexist in a city. In each skill 
group, a fixed proportion of workers will become new entrepreneurs and immobile. 
The high-skill entrepreneurs have an exogenous probability of producing new ideas 
that employ high-skill workers, but the low-skill workers can only produce ideas 
that employ low-skill workers. The presence of high-skill workers in a city will 
potentially benefit the low-skill through raising the demand for low-skill workers, 
but they will also harm the low-skill by raising the housing costs. Hence, the high-
skill and the low-skill workers will live separately, when the high-skill workers live 
in a city with inelastic housing supply, and when they are more likely to invent 




Quality of matching 
Venables (2011) argues that, because low-quality workers are kept out by high 
housing price,  expensive cities enhance the working efficiency for the high-
quality workers by improving the average quality of their working partners. Hence, 
the high-quality workers will sort into large and expensive cities, while the low-
quality workers will sort to small and cheap cities. 
 
There are two cities, expensive and cheap, and two types of workers, high-quality 
and low-quality. Each worker must choose a city, pay an urban cost and collaborate 
with another partner in the city to produce a traded good, but the quality of potential 
partner is unobservable. Group productivity increases with the quality of both 
members, but good matching is worth more for high-quality workers (assumption 
of supermodularity of production technology). In equilibrium, all high-quality 
workers will sort into expensive cities, if the rent differential is sufficiently high to 
keep the low-quality workers out from the expensive cities, but not too high to be 
compensated by the benefits from better matching. In essence, the author argues 
that urban environment can serve as a self-selection mechanism that allows the 
high-quality workers to signal their ability by living in expensive cities. 
 
Knowledge spillover as pure externalities 
Giannetti (2003) argues that high-skill workers have a high propensity to move to 
the most productive regions. It happens because the high-skill workers received a 
higher reward for their skill in a city with a higher average stock of human capital. 
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The externalities stem from knowledge spillover and improved opportunities for 
learning (Jacobs, 1970; Lucas, 1988; Marshall, 1890; Rauch, 1993). 
  
The author considers an overlapping generation model with infinite periods. In each 
period, workers with heterogeneous skills are randomly born in one of two cities, 
North and South, that the latter has lower initial stock of human capital. Workers 
can pay a migration cost to leave their origin cities. The total factor productivity 
(TFP) complements worker's skill in producing traded goods and it increases with 
the average level of human capital in the city. Hence, in equilibrium, skill premium 
increases with the local average level of human capital.  
 
In the asymmetric equilibrium, the high-skill workers that are born in the South will 
move to the North, if the difference in reward for skill is sufficiently high to 
compensate their migration costs. The low-skill workers that are born in the North 
will move to the South, only when the differential in living costs is sufficiently high.  
 
Their study is consistent with several studies on migration that show highly skilled 
workers tend to migrate to the regions where the concentration of human capital is 
highest (Giannetti, 2001). But, their study treats knowledge spillover as a pure 
externality, which is available freely to everyone in the city, it is close to assuming 





Instead of treating learning effect as pure externalities, Davis and Dingel (2012) 
assume that learning is costly in time. They consider the role of cities as learning 
communities where workers spend time on learning to improve their productivity. 
The high-skill workers sort into the large and expensive city, because they benefit 
more from learning and the large and expensive city offer better opportunities for 
learning. Their "learning hypothesis" is supported by empirical studies (Fu & Liao, 
2014). 
 
In a simple version of their model, there are two cities with symmetric fundamentals 
and two sectors, traded and non-traded. Workers are heterogeneous in skills. Each 
worker allocates one unit of time between producing and learning. Learning can 
improve worker's productivity in the traded sector, but has no effect on that in the 
non-traded sector. The learning benefit is proportional to worker's skill, time spent 
on learning and local learning opportunities. Local learning opportunities will be 
improved, if there are more high-skill workers in the city and, if they spend a larger 
amount of time on learning. Each worker consumes a fixed amount of land and 
non-traded goods. Land price increases with city size. In equilibrium, the low-skill 
workers specialize in producing service goods, and they are indifferent between 
two cities. The high-skill workers will sort into the larger and more expensive city 
that has a better learning opportunity.  
 
In general, Davis and Dingel (2012) contributes to the literature by showing that 
three important stylized facts can emerge from a spatial model with symmetric 
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fundamentals, i.e., skill sorting of the high-skill into large cities, positive correlation 
between city size and skill premium, and higher migration rate of high-skill workers.  
 
Complementarity between skills and business service 
Distinguished from previous studies, Hendricks (2011) argues that it is the 
advantage of the business service sector that attracts the high-skill workers to the 
large cities. The author assumes that business services are produced subject to 
economics of scale. In equilibrium, because intermediate inputs (business service) 
complement skills, the high-skill workers sort to the cities with large service sectors 
and the land price differential keeps low-skill workers from entering the large cities. 
Their prediction is consistent with Davis and Henderson (2008) that firms locate 
their skill intensive headquarters in cities with large business services sectors. 
 
Non-homothetic preference for consumption amenities 
Lee (2010) provides a consumption-based theory for skill sorting across 
metropolitan areas. The author shows that high-skill workers will sort in large cities, 
provided that large cities offer more varieties of local goods and that the local goods 
are luxury goods. 
 
There is a continuum of cities, where both land price and consumption varieties 
increase with the city population. Workers with heterogeneous skills can either 
choose to live in one of the cities or receive a reservation utility that increases with 
their skill. The author also assumes that each worker inelastically consumes one 
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unit of land and spend the rest of the income on the local goods. This assumption 
makes the income elasticity of demand for local goods greater than one. Production 
of each variety of local goods requires all types of skill, implying that all skill types 
must be present in every city. 
 
In equilibrium, workers are indifferent across cities. For high land rent in large 
cities, the workers are compensated through two channels: receiving an urban wage 
premium and enjoying a greater amount of varieties. The author shows that, 
because the benefits from the latter channel increase with skill, the urban wage 
premium decreases with skill. Because the wage of high-skill workers is relatively 
lower, firms in large cities will hire more high-skill workers. Hence, the model also 
predicts that high-skill workers tend to concentrate in large cities.  
 
Idiosyncratic amenities, inelastic housing supply and population growth  
Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) show that when idiosyncratic tastes for locations 
are uncorrelated with income, asymmetric housing supply elasticity across cities is 
sufficient for population growth to drive dispersion in house price. In particular, 
cities with inelastic housing supply are “superstar” cities—they become more 
expensive, hence more exclusive to high-income households. 
 
Imperfect substitution of skills and asymmetric total productivity factor 
Eeckhout et al. (2014) is the only theoretical study that accounts for the fat-tail skill 
distribution in the large cities. The authors assume that cities are ex-ante 
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asymmetric in the total factor of productivity (TFP), which is accessible to all local 
firms. High-skill, middle-skill and low-skill workers are imperfect substitutes in the 
production of tradable goods. Due to the scarcity of high-skill and low-skill workers, 
their marginal productivity is higher than that of the middle-skill worker. This 
marginal productivity advantage is further amplified in the large cities where the 
higher TFP complements the skills. Hence, high-skill workers and low-skill 
workers disproportionately sort into the large cities. 
 
2.4 Economic Status of Neighborhoods 
Income-residential pattern 
In most of the metropolitan areas in the US, residents in the suburban area tend to 
be richer than those living in the central city (Brueckner & Rosenthal, 2009; Glaeser, 
Kahn, & Rappaport, 2008). Using census tract-level data from the 2000 decennial 
Census, Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2008) show that average household income 
rises monotonically with distance to the city center in Atlanta, Los Angeles and 
Phoenix (Figure 2-3). But, important exceptions also exist. The income-distance 
relation is U-shaped in some large metropolitan areas, including New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia (Figure 2-4). In these metropolitan areas, the central cities 
are home to affluent families. 
 
Housing price pattern 
Edlund, Machado and Sviatchi (2015) document that housing price premium at city 
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center has been increasing, since 1980. We present their finding in Figure 2-5. Back 
in 1980, housing prices beyond 10 miles from city centers were higher than that 
within 10 miles of city centers. In 2010, housing price at city center was the highest, 
and it decreases dramatically with distance from city center. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Income and distance from the CBD in three new cities 




Figure 2-4: Income and distance from the CBD in three old cities 




Figure 2-5: Housing price and distance from the CBD: 
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year 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 
Source: Edlund, Machado and Sviatchi (2015) 
 
2.5 Theories of Income-Residential Pattern within Cities 
Previous literature highlights several key determinants of income-residential 
pattern within the metropolitan area. They include 1) trade-off between commuting 
cost and land expenditure 2) access to public transportation 3) proximity to 
amenities 4) filtering process in housing market 5) fiscal externalities and local 
public goods. We will review them in sequence. 
 
Trade-off between commuting cost and land/housing expenditure 
Wheaton (1974) argues that the observed urban poverty can be attributed to rich 
people's incentive to consume more land, provided that land price is lower in 
suburban region. The author assumes that residents are heterogeneous in income. 
They derive utility from housing good and numéraire good that are both normal and 
have positive income effects. In spatial equilibrium, the bid rent offered by each 
resident is pinned down, such that any resident is indifferent about moving 
marginally away or toward to the CBD. The heterogeneous residents are ordered in 
the spatial dimension, such that the resident with steeper bid rent curve live closer 
to the CBD. The author shows that, if the income elasticity of demand for land is 
greater than the income elasticity of commuting costs, poor residents will occupy 
smaller dwellings close to the CBD, while the rich will live in the suburban area 
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and occupy a larger parcel of land. 
 
Because this explanation for the income-residential location pattern hinges greatly 
on consumer’s preference patterns, in his later study (Wheaton, 1977), the author 
attempts to test empirically whether these preference patterns hold in US scenario. 
Using household data collected from the San Francisco metropolitan area, the 
author estimates the coefficients of consumer’s utility function. He finds that 
income elasticity of demand for land and income elasticity of commuting costs are 
roughly equal. Hence, the author concludes that the flight of the rich from central 
city is less a result of the incentive to consume more land, as indicated by Wheaton 
(1974). The pattern is mostly due to other determinants, including fiscal 
liberalization, social preference, racial externalities. 
 
Access to public transportation 
Glaeser et al. (2008) also challenge the relevance of monocentric model with 
heterogeneous income in explaining the poverty in the central city. The authors 
argue that income elasticity of commuting costs must be close to one, since the 
commuting costly in time. Then, they estimate the income elasticity of demand for 
housing, by regressing the log parcel size on log income, using the data from 2003 
American Housing Survey. They show that the income elasticity of demand for 
housing is between 0.1 to 0.3, and it is well below one. Hence, the authors argue 
that the income elasticity of demand for land is too low to justify the urban poverty 




Alternatively, following LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983), they suggest that better 
access to public transportation is one key determinant of residential location by 
income. The authors incorporate two modes of transportation: public transportation 
and automobile. Taking public transportation requires high fixed cost in time and 
is slow. Driving requires high fixed financial cost but is fast. The central city has 
the high population density that is required for public transit. Then, the author 
shows that, if the poor households have a comparative advantage in using public 
transit and public transit has a comparative advantage in commutes for a short 
distance, the poor households will live in the central city in equilibrium. 
 
Access to amenities 
Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) proposed an amenity-based explanation for 
the pattern of residential location by income in the city. There are two income 
groups in the economy, rich and poor. Residents derive utility from consuming 
housing goods, numéraire goods, and exogenous amenities. Marginal valuation of 
amenities rises sharply with income.  
 
Under these assumptions, the relative location of the rich to the poor is not only 
determined by the tradeoff between housing expenditure and commuting costs, but 
also the spatial distribution of exogenous amenities. If exogenous amenities 
increases with the distance to the CBD, then it will work in the same direction as 
the conventional forces, further attract the rich to live in the suburban area. But, if 
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amenities decreases with the distance to the CBD, the rich will live in the city center, 
provided that valuation of amenities increases rapidly with income and demand for 
land is not too income elastic. 
 
The authors further extend their analysis to incorporate one type of endogenous 
amenity - the average income of neighborhood. The authors assume that the rich 
have a preference for the high-income neighborhood. Accounting for endogenous 
amenities can lead to multiple types of equilibrium. In particular, the rich might 
live in a neighborhood with low exogenous amenities, as long as endogenous 
amenities are sufficiently high to cover this shortage. 
 
Filtering in housing market 
Rosenthal (2008) and Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009) argue that gentrification pattern can 
stem from filtering process in the housing market. The authors emphasize that the rich has 
a preference for new housing units. Hence, as housing units at city center deteriorate, the 
rich will leave city center and move to suburban areas, where new housing developments 
occur. Their study can also potentially reconcile the varying Income-residential patterns 
across cities. In growing metropolitan areas, housing units in the suburban area tend to be 
newly built, hence, will attract the rich households. In old metropolitan areas, one or more 
rings at a different distance to city center experience redevelopments, hence, will be 
occupied by rich households. In a later study, Rosenthal (2014) shows that housing filters 
down with housing age and more quickly when the housing is new. Hence, the author 





Fiscal externalities and local public goods 
DeBartolome and Ross (2003) highlight the role of local public services and fiscal 
in determining Income-residential pattern within a city. They embed fiscal 
competition (Tiebout, 1956) into the monocentric model. They assume that there 
are two income groups in the economy, rich and poor. All workers commute to 
work in the city center, and the commuting cost is higher for the rich. The 
consumers derive utility from a numéraire good and public services. Each consumer 
occupies a fixed amount of land. The city consists of two rings, i.e., inner city, and 
suburb. Within each jurisdiction, residents vote to determine the level of public 
services and finance it by residence tax.  
 
Under these assumptions, the authors show that there are both income-sorting 
equilibrium and income mixing equilibrium. In the income-mixing equilibrium, the 
poor is the majority in the inner city, and they vote for a low level of public services 
that keeps the majority of the rich out of the inner city. 
 
2.6 Spatial Interactions 
There are also some studies that embed interaction among consumers or firms in 
the spatial model (Beckmann, 1976; Borukhov & Hochman, 1977; Fujita & Ogawa, 
1982; Fujita & Thisse, 2013). 
 
Interactions among firms 
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Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) propose a theory of urban land use that 
interactions among firms improve firm’s productivity. Instead of taking the location 
of firms as exogenous, they allow workers and firms to compete for land at all 
locations in the city.  
 
They assume that homogeneous agents consume traded good and residential land. 
Workers commute to work and incur a commuting cost regarding forsaken labor 
time. Production of traded goods not only requires labor but also land input. Hence, 
firms must compete with workers for land at all locations. Besides, there is an 
externality in the traded good sector. The level of externality available to a firm is 
determined by its relative location to the other firms, and it decays with distance. 
The assumption on externality conveys the idea that firms in a district with high 
employment density tend to benefit more from knowledge spillover. 
 
In equilibrium, the location of firms and workers are simultaneously determined. 
Land at any location is allocated to either residential use or production use that 
offers higher bid rent. The authors identify a tradeoff faced by firms in choosing 
the production sites. If a firm chooses a location that is close to other firms but far 
from workers’ residential location, it will benefit from higher production 
externality, but it has to pay a higher wage to workers to compensate for the higher 
commuting costs. On the contrary, if a firm chooses a location close to the 
residential location of workers but far from other firms, it can save on commuting 




They find that the configuration of city land use is sensitive to the level of 
commuting cost. When commuting cost is low, the city will have a central business 
area, surrounded by residential land. When commuting cost is high, the pattern of 
mixed land use will emerge. 
 
Endogenous interactions among consumers 
Although most of the studies assume that interactions among agents only depend 
on agents' locations, two recent studies assume that benefits from interactions also 
depend on the time devoted.  
 
Helsley and Strange (2007) turn to explore the effect of endogenous non-market 
interactions on urban form and city efficiency. The authors assume that 
homogeneous consumers derive utility from a numéraire good, housing good and 
interaction with other consumers. Interactions among consumers only occur at an 
exogenous city center. To interact with others, an individual must visit the city 
center and pay a travel cost. The value of each visit depends on the interaction 
quality that increases with the total number of visits at the city level. Hence, when 
a consumer visits the city center, she also has a positive spillover effect on other 
consumers through improving the quality of interactions. Instead of assuming 
interaction among agents to be determined by agent’s location choice, the authors 
allow agents to choose their intensity of interaction with others. Urban interactions 




Because of the externalities, the market fails to achieve first-best outcomes. There 
are too few interactions occurring at city center in equilibrium because consumers 
do not fully account for their contribution to the quality of interactions. Then, the 
author proposes to subsidize transportation to achieve the first-best levels of visits 
and population density.  
 
In another study, Helsley and Zenou (2014) explore how social network interacts 
with the residential location of heterogeneous agents. The authors assume that 
consumers derive utility from a numéraire good and interactions. Each consumer 
chooses the level of efforts that they put in interacting with other agents. 
 
There are two locations in the economy, i.e., core and peripheral. All interactions 
occur at the core location. Agents who live at the peripheral location must visit the 
core location to interact with other agents and pay a travel cost. The author further 
assumes that agents are heterogeneous in their locations in the social network. Their 
centrality in the social network has a positive effect on the value of their each 
interaction. 
 
Based on these assumptions, the authors find that the agents who are at the center 
of social network or live close to interaction center will choose a high level of 
interactions in equilibrium. Besides, the level of interactions in the whole economy 
also increases with the density of links in the social network and the density of 
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population in geographic space. Hence, their study shows that high urban density 
and closer social connections among agents will favor the interactions in the city. 
Then, the authors allow agents to choose their residential locations endogenously. 
As expected, they find the agents who are located at the center of social network 
tend to live closer to the center of interaction. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
In this section, we highlight some key insights that we draw from the literature 
review and discuss them in sequence. First, recent studies document the rise of 
"consumer city", featuring that high-skill workers live in city center, even though 
they travel to work in suburbs. Second, preference for non-traded goods and 
services is non-homothetic. Local consumption amenities are more valuable to the 
high-skill, rich workers. Third, high-skill and low-skill workers are complementary 
through non-traded service market. The presence of high-skill workers will 
improve the job opportunities for the low-skill, and the low-skill workers can create 
the precious consumption amenities that attract the high-skill. Fourth, despite the 
salient empirical evidence on "consumer city", theoretical research on the topic is 
strikingly limited. Most of the previous studies that focus on skill sorting across 
cities emphasize the role of city as "manufacturing center." The only exception is 
Lee (2010). In that study, difference in consumption varieties across cities is taken 
as exogenous, rather than determined by consumer choices. The literature on the 
internal structure of the city is in a similar situation. As far as we know, there are 
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no theories that explore the internal structure and efficiency of a consumer city. 
Fifth, previous studies are not able to explain the pattern of skill sorting revealed in 
recent empirical studies. Although most of the theoretical studies can capture the 
pattern that high-skill workers disproportionately sort into large cities, they neglect 
the fact that low-skill workers are also overrepresented in the large cities. The only 
exception is Eeckhout et al. (2014), who relies on a disputable assumption that cities 
have ex-ante asymmetric total productivity factors. Different from Eeckhout et al. 
(2014), our first study shows that asymmetric spatial equilibrium can emerge across 
perfectly symmetry locations in the presence of increasing returns in local 





3 Emergent Superstar Cities 
 
Abstracts 
An important insight in Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy5(4), 2013),that rising aggregate demand, rather than diverging 
local productivity, accounts for the widening house price dispersion across US 
cities after WWII, rests on the assumption of idiosyncratic location preferences and 
asymmetric housing supply elasticity across cities. Under such assumptions, cities 
with inelastic housing supply are “superstar” cities—they get more expensive, 
hence more exclusive to high-income households, as aggregate demand increases. 
We sharpen and extend this insight by presenting a model where “superstar” cities 
emerge from the interaction between increasing returns to local demand for 
differentiated non-traded services and non-homothetic preferences, instead of 
idiosyncratic location preferences and asymmetric housing supply elasticity. We 
consider an economy with heterogeneous workers differentiated by skill level, who 
earn income from employment either in the traded-good sector, where worker 
productivity depends on skill but not location, or in the non-traded-service sector, 
where worker productivity depends on local demand but not skill. A fixed cost is 
required for each variety of local service, giving rise to increasing return to local 
demand, which is income elastic. In equilibrium, high-skill workers share the 
location with a greater variety of local services and higher land rent, middle-skill 
workers prefer the location with less variety of local services and lower land rent, 
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low-skill workers, who specialize in non-traded sector, are indifferent between 
locations. The model can also account for skill dispersion within cities, rising non-
traded sector employment share, and a U-shaped welfare change across skill 
spectrum, as a result of increased skill disparity in the economy.  
 
Key words: skill disparity, income sorting; house price dispersion; increasing 
return; taste for variety. 
 




House price dispersion across US metropolitan areas has widened considerably since 
World War II. Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2013) offer a fundamental insight that the 
widened dispersion can be a result of aggregate demand increase rather than local 
productivity divergence. They show that, when idiosyncratic tastes for locations are 
uncorrelated with income, asymmetric housing supply elasticity across cities is 
sufficient for aggregate to drive house price dispersion. In particular, cities with 
inelastic housing supply are “superstar” cities—they become more expensive, hence 
more exclusive to high-income households, as aggregate demand rises. We sharpen and 
extend this insight by presenting a model where “superstar” cities emerge from the 
interaction between increasing returns to local demand for differentiated non-traded 
services and non-homothetic consumer preferences, instead of idiosyncratic location 
preferences and asymmetric housing supply elasticity.  
 
I consider an economy where heterogeneous workers, differentiated by skill level, are 
perfectly mobile and earn income from employment either in the traded-good sector or 
in the non-traded-service sector. Worker productivity in the former sector depends on 
skill but not location, whereas in the latter sector, worker’s wage depends on local 
demand but not skill. A fixed cost is required for each variety of local service, giving 
rise to increasing return to local demand. Workers derive their utility from the 
consumption of a numéraire traded good, housing, and differentiated non-traded 
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services. The preferences are non-homothetic such that the demand for local service 
variety is income elastic. The equilibrium is characterized by worker choices of 
employment occupation and residential location, wage rates for non-traded service 
workers and land rent differential across cities clear the labor and housing markets. In 
equilibrium, low-skill workers choose non-traded service occupation according to 
comparative advantage. Also, high-skill traded-sector workers share the location with 
a greater variety of local services and higher land rent, middle-skill traded-sector 
workers choose the location with less variety of local services and lower land rent, low-
skill non-traded service workers are indifferent between locations, and worker utility is 
convex, non-decreasing, in skill level. Increasing population skill disparity by raising 
the share of high-skill workers in the economy has the effect of elevating the demand 
for the variety of non-traded services, enabling the high-skill city to offer a greater 
variety of local services and thus become more attractive and more expensive. 
 
Besides predicting widening house price dispersion as population skill disparity 
increases, the model accounts for several additional important features:1) more 
expensive cities tend to be larger in population and also have a wider skill spectrum, 2) 
non-traded sector employment share increases with population skill disparity, and3) 
increased population skill disparity produces U-shaped welfare changes across skill 
spectrum. While the evidence on the first two features is readily available in the 
literature, the last feature is broadly perceived but not fully appreciated. Our model 
predicts that increased population skill disparity actually benefits non-traded service 
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workers, who have relatively low skills, and hurt traded-sector workers, who generally 
have high skills. The middle-skill traded-sector workers tend to suffer most. This 
happens because the increased skill disparity, as a result of rising share of high-skill 
workers in the economy, elevates the demand for non-traded services, raising the wage 
cost in the non-traded sector. The middle-skill workers, who do not benefit from the 
rising wage in the non-traded sector, suffer the most because they are hurt not only by 
the rising labor cost of non-traded services but also by getting pushed to smaller cities 
to have less variety of non-traded services to enjoy. 
 
Our model is rooted in the tradition of the new economic geography literature (Fujita 
et al., 2001; Krugman, 1991) by emphasizing the role of increasing return at the city 
level in sustaining asymmetric spatial equilibrium. We focus on the increasing return 
with respect to local consumer amenity instead of that with respect to traded-sector 
productivity. Incorporating the latter is equivalent to augmenting the skill disparity, 
which reinforces the asymmetric equilibrium driven by the consumer amenity benefit. 
Imperfectly elastic housing supply is necessary to prevent the degenerate equilibrium 
with only one populated city. But relying not on asymmetric housing supply elasticity 
to drive asymmetric spatial equilibrium is important. Housing supply elasticity is not 
totally exogenous and can be altered by local land use regulations (Hilber & Robert-
Nicoud, 2013). Moreover, restricting housing supply does not necessary give a city any 
advantage in attracting high-skill workers; indeed, doing so can hurt the city’s 
attractiveness by limiting the local demand size and hence the variety of non-traded 
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services.   
 
The key premises of our model are consistent with empirical evidence. Increasing 
returns to local demand density for consumer amenities are documented by Couture 
(2013) and Schiff (2014). Handbury and Weinstein (2012) examine barcode data and 
find larger metropolitan areas in the US offer a larger variety of grocery goods and 
lower grocery retail price index. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) also documented that 
large cities in Europe and US outperformed their smaller counterparts with respect to 
consumption benefits. The assumption of non-homothetic preferences is supported by 
the finding of increasing willingness to pay with skill level for non-traded amenities 
offered by large cities in Lee (2010) and Fu and Liao (2014).  
 
Our model predicts a wider skill spectrum in the larger, more skilled cities, as these 
cities employ disproportionally more low-skill non-traded service workers. This 
prediction is consistent with the stylized fact that both high-skill and low-skill workers 
disproportionately sort into large cities (Combes et al., 2012; Eeckhout, Pinheiro, & 
Schmidheiny, 2010). Davis and Dingel (2012) also assume that non-traded service 
sector requires no formal skills and hence employ low-skill workers. Empirical 
evidence shows that the presence of high-skill workers improves employment outcomes 
for low-skill workers, especially for those employed in the non-traded service sector. 
Moretti (2010b), for example, finds that one additional skilled job in the traded sector 
generates 2.5 jobs in local goods and services sector in U.S. cities. Additional evidence 
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can be found in Moretti and Thulin (2013), Manning (2004), and Kaplanis (2010a).  
 
Skill sorting across cities is extensively documented in the literature (Bacolod et al., 
2009; Combes et al., 2012; Henderson, 1974). Most studies focus on productive 
advantages of skill sorting, such as skill complementarity in production (Baum-Snow 
& Pavan, 2012, 2013; Berry & Glaeser, 2005; Combes et al., 2008; Giannetti, 2001, 
2003; Glaeser & Resseger, 2010; Matano & Naticchioni, 2012; Mion & Naticchioni, 
2009), learning externalities (D. R. Davis & Dingel, 2012), and sharing of intermediate 
inputs (J. C. Davis & Henderson, 2008; Hendricks, 2011). Behrens et al (2010), 
Venables (2011) and Davis and Dingel (2012) are recent examples that provide 
microfoundation for asymmetric spatial equilibrium and skill sorting across symmetric 
locations driven by agglomeration economies in traded-good production. Our present 
paper is in the same spirit as these examples but focuses instead on agglomeration 
economies with respect to non-traded service supply and consumption benefits. 
Adamson et al. (2004) and Gottlieb and Glaeser (2006) also highlight the consumption 
benefits of skill sorting, but they assume an exogenous distribution of consumer 
amenities. 
 
Our model is presented in section (3.2). The sorting equilibrium is characterized in 
section (3.3). Section (3.4) provides an algorithm that searches for equilibrium solutions. 




3.2 The Model 
I consider an economy with two cities at symmetric locations. The economy has a 
population of perfectly mobile workers with heterogeneous skill levels. They consume 
housing in one of the two cities, a numéraire traded good, and a bundle of differentiated 
non-traded services. They have a taste for variety of non-traded services, and their 
utility function is non-homothetic such that the income elasticity of demand for the non-
traded services is greater than unity. The productivity of traded-good producers equals 
to their skill level but is independent of location, whereas the wage of non-traded-
service producers is independent of their skill level but is subject to increasing return 
with respect to local demand (market thickness). The housing supply in each city is 
imperfectly elastic so that housing price dispersion widens as housing consumptions in 
two cities diverge. In such a setting, we show that the relatively low-skill workers will 
choose to specialize in producing non-traded services and cities will specialize with 
respect to different diversity of local services to cater to different income segments. The 
city that offers a greater diversity of local services (low non-traded-service price) and a 
higher compensating housing price—the superstar city—caters to high skill workers, 
who have greater willingness to pay for local service diversity, and also attracts a greater 
proportion of low-skill workers to provide non-traded services. 
3.2.1 Consumption 
Workers derive their utility from the consumption of a traded good, X, composite non-
traded services, S, and housing, H. Previous studies have shown that the income 
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elasticity of demand for housing expenditure is less than 1 (Albouy, 2008; Glaeser et 
al., 2008; Moretti, 2013).I assume that both housing and the traded good are necessity 
goods. Thus income elasticity of demand for non-traded services is greater than 1. This 
is a key assumption that drives spatial sorting of skills in our model.  
 
Consumers’ preference is defined by the indirect utility function, 
 




   
= −       1  (3-1) 
where I  is individual income, P  is the price of a composite good of housing and 
traded good. G  is composite price index of non-traded services. We let workers have 
a taste for variety of non-traded services, by defining G  as, 
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where ( )p i  is the price for variety i , n is the range of varieties produced and  
is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. 
The composite price index P  is given by, 
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where hP  is housing price and XP  is price of traded good price. The Cobb-Douglas 
                                                 


























form of the composite price index implies that expenditure share of housing is a 
constant α  of total expenditure on housing and traded good; 0 1α< < . We use the 
traded good as numéraire good, thus setting XP  to 1. 0 1ε< <  measures the degree of 
non-homotheticity of the utility. If 0ε = , the utility is homothetic. 0γ >  will define the 
price elasticity of housing and traded-good consumption. 
 
The specified indirect utility function (3-1) is a subclass of price independent 
generalized linearity (PIGL) preferences rooted in Muellbauer (1975, 1976). The utility 























> GPI  In the rest of paper, we choose parameters such that this 















Proof. See the Appendix 
 
By Roy’s identity, the demand for traded good X and that for housing H by a worker 
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The income elasticity of demand for housing and the traded good is 1 ε− . The price 
elasticity for housing is αγ −1 . The demand for non-traded-service variety i by a 
worker is given by 
 
,
/ ( ) 1/ ( )S i
V p i I G G Pq
V I G p i I G
σ ε γ
β  ∂ ∂    = − = −      ∂ ∂           (3-6) 
Note that income needs to be sufficiently high to generate both a positive demand for 
non-traded services and a positive utility. We must haveγ ≥ ε  so that positive demand 
for non-traded services guarantees positive utility and the demands for the traded good 
and housing are non-increasing in the composite price index for non-traded services. 
3.2.2 Production 
3.2.2.1 Non-traded Service Sector 
Non-traded services are produced by labor independent of skill and the production 
technology is identical for all varieties in all locations. Each worker supplies one unit 
of labor. The supply of each variety of non-traded services requires a fixed cost of F
units of labor. The fixed cost can be in the form of research and development, setting 
up necessary equipment and shops, or obtaining necessary business licenses. In addition, 
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each unit of service output also requires a constant marginal labor inputc . Producing a 
quantity ( )z i of any variety thus requires l  units of labor input: 
 ( )l F cz i= +   (3-7) 
Given a wage rate w for labor in non-traded service sector and price ( )p i ,the profit 
 for reach service variety is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i p i z i w F cz ip é ù= - +ë û  (3-8) 
Given a constant price elasticity of demand, profit maximization entails a constant 






s= -   (3-9) 
Free entry drives the profit to zero, 
 
( ) ( )* *1 0
1
i w cz i Fp s
æ ö÷ç= - =÷ç ÷÷ç -è ø   (3-10) 
Thus, the equilibrium output for each variety is given by 
 
( ) ( )1 /z i F cs* = -
  (3-11) 
which requires a labor input of 
 
l Fs* =
   (3-12) 
I choose the unit of measure for labor input such that . Thus, 
 
( )z i Fs* =
  (3-13) 
 ( )*p i w= .  (3-14) 
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3.2.2.2 Traded Goods Sector 
Work productivity in the traded-good sector benefits from formal training that produces 
skills. We define skill level such that each worker’s productivity (employment income) 
in the traded-good sector equals his skill level, indicated by index b. The distribution of 
b in the worker population is described by a density function, ( )k b ,on a finite support 
. Workers are free to choose employment in any sector. Comparative advantage a 
la Roy (1951) allocates low-skill workers to the sector where skill does not benefit 
productivity. Specifically, given the wage rate w in the non-traded service sector, 
workers with skill level below w will choose employment in the non-traded sector and 
those with b>w will choose employment in the traded-good sector. 
3.2.2.3 Housing Sector 
Following Behrens et al. (2010) and Davis and Dingle (2012), we adopt a most stripped-
down representation of the housing sector. Housing service is produced by capital only. 
A standard monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964a; Behrens et al., 2010; R. F. Muth, 
1969) entails a constant cost of housing service (including commuting cost and land 
rent) throughout the city as land rent varies by location to compensate differential 
commuting cost. That cost of housing service in location j, denoted by , must 
increase with city size in terms of total quantity of housing space consumed Qh, j ; the 
rate of increase, however, will depend on the city’s housing supply elasticity, which 
regulates the residential density. We assume  where parameters  





We first characterize equilibrium for the case of two ex-ante identical locations, labeled 
city 1 and city 2 respectively. Individual workers choose a city to live, an occupation 
and the consumption bundle to maximize their own utility. In equilibrium, non-traded 
sector wage rates in each city, w1 and w2, housing prices, and , and composite 
non-traded service prices G1 and G2, clear the market for non-traded service workers 
and housing in each city. Spatial equilibrium requires any advantage of lower composite 
non-traded service price to be compensated by a higher housing price such that a 
marginal worker will be indifferent between two cities.   
 
To build the intuition for the basic properties of an asymmetric equilibrium, Figure 3-1 
shows the utility offered by each city for workers at different skill levels. Without loss 
of generality, we assume city 1 to have a lower composite non-traded service price and 
higher housing price: G1 < G2  and Ph,1 > Ph,2 . The utility offer curve of city 1 is steeper, 
with a slope of G1−ε ε . With a higher composite non-traded service price G2, the slope 
of the utility offer curve of city 2 is smaller, G2−ε ε . A lower housing price  shifts 
the city 2 utility offer curve to the left and determines the cutoff skill level b1, above 
which skill the traded-sector workers will live in city 1. The non-traded sector wage 
rate in city 2, w2, determines the cutoff skill level b2= w2, below which skill the workers 
are better off employed in the non-traded sector. Non-traded service workers enjoy the 
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same utility level represented by the horizontal line in Figure 3-1 that intersects the 
utility offer curve of city 2 at b2. The intersection of this horizontal line with the utility 
offer curve of city 1 determines the non-traded service wage rate in city 1, w1, which 
compensates the non-traded service workers in city 1 for the housing price premium 
Ph,1 − Ph,2 . The equilibrium utility across the skill spectrum is thus convex and non-
decreasing in skill level; it is constant for low-skill workers in the non-traded service 
sector, it then rises with skill level above the cutoff point b2 along the city 2 utility offer 
curve until the cutoff point b1, it then rises more steeply along the utility offer curve of 
city 1 above the cutoff skill level b1. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Utility offered by City 1 and City 2 at different skill level 
 
Although the exact positions of two utility offer curves must be determined in general 
equilibrium, it is clear from Figure 3-1 that, as long as the composite non-traded service 
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price is lower in city 1, city 2 must offer a lower housing price in order to have any 
positive number of workers to populate it. And as long as the composite non-traded 
service prices offered by the two cities are different, traded-sector workers sort 
themselves perfectly by skill levels between the two cities. High-skill workers outbid 
middle-skill workers in the city offering a lower composite non-traded service price. 
We formalize this result in proposition I. 
 
Proposition I (skill sorting of traded-sector workers) 
In asymmetric equilibrium, cities offer different levels of composite non-traded service 
price and different housing prices that compensate the difference in composite non-
traded service price. Moreover, high-skill traded-sector workers sort into the city with 
a low composite non-traded service price but a higher housing price (City 1);the 
middle-skill traded-sector workers sort into the city with a high composite non-traded 
service price but a low housing price (City 2).  
Proof. See the Appendix 
 
Figure 3-1 shows that, given the population mass L and skill distribution k(b), consumer 
preferences, production technologies, and housing supply elasticity, the asymmetric 
equilibrium is fully characterized by the two skill cutoff levels b1 and b2. The equations 
(3-15) through (3-25) below define these two cutoff skill levels. Equation (3-15) defines 
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ε γ ε γβ β
ε γ ε γ
       
− = −                 (3-15) 
Equation (3-16) defines the cutoff skill 2b , such that the workers with skill 2b are 
indifferent between employment in the traded sector and employment in non-traded 
service sector, 
 2 2b w=   (3-16) 
Equation (3-17) describes the condition for non-traded service workers to be indifferent 
between two cities: 
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1 1w P w P
G G G G
ε γ ε γβ β
ε γ ε γ
       
− = −                 (3-17) 
The total population of non-traded service workers in the whole economy is
. Let  to denote the proportion of them who live in city 1. Equations 
(3-18) and (3-19) define the service price index in each city, 
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(3-21) 
On the right-hand side is the aggregate demand for individual variety in each city, which 
must equals Fσ , to assure that the producers earn zero profit. 
 
Equation (3-22) through (3-25) define the clearing of housing markets in both cities. 
1
1 1 1 1
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 ,1 ,1h hP Q
rq=   (3-24) 
 ,2 ,2h hP Q
rq=   (3-25) 
In asymmetric equilibrium, our model predicts that non-traded sector employment in 
superstar city, i.e., city 1 (with a low composite non-traded service price and a higher 
housing price), is always greater than that in city 2, as stated in the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition II (employment in non-traded service sector) 
In asymmetric equilibrium, non-traded sector employment is larger in City 1 (with a 
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lower composite non-traded service price and a higher housing price)than in City 2. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Intuitively, non-traded service workers in superstar city earn a lower wage than the 
cutoff traded sector workers, who are indifferent between the two cities. To compensate 
the low-skill service workers, who do not benefit very much from a low composite non-
traded service price, the superstar city must pay a higher wage to compensate them for 
the higher housing price. Eventually, the population of low-skill workers, as well as the 
number of service varieties they produce, must grow to the extent that the service price 
index in the superstar city is lower despite the higher non-traded sector labor cost. 
 
In summary, the asymmetric equilibrium emerging from the interaction between non-
homothetic preferences and increasing return to local demand for non-traded consumer 
amenities, the supply of which employs low-skill workers, has richer implications 
beyond house price dispersion. The model also predicts the impact of aggregate skill 
distribution on income disparity within as well as between cities, on the employment 
of non-traded sector in the economy and across cities, and on the size distribution of 
cities. Since these predictions are based on structural parameters, such as income and 
price elasticity of demand, taste for variety, increasing return in non-traded service 
supply, housing supply elasticity, and skill distribution, the model can be calibrated to 






To illustrate the emergence of an asymmetric equilibrium, we provide an algorithm to 
find equilibrium cutoff skill levels b1 and b2. We adopt a bounded Pareto distribution 
to characterize the aggregate skill distribution. The Pareto distribution is a good 
approximation for income distribution observed in many countries, such as US. Its 
shape can be modified by a single parameter, a shape parameter ξ, which also 
determines inequality measures such as Gini coefficient. We adopt a support for the 
skill distribution from 1 to 100, to broadly reflect the reality of productivity spectrum 
across individuals in an economy like the US. Thus the skill probability density function 
is given by k(b) = ξb−ξ−1 1− 0.01ξ( ) , with , which has a mean value of 
approximately ξ ξ −1( )  and a Gini coefficient of approximately 1 2ξ −1( ) .  
 
The existence of the equilibrium can be demonstrated using a phase diagram for the 
two cutoff skill levels  and 2b , as shown in Figure 3-2. The horizontal axis of the 
diagram is skill cutoff for service workers, 2b , and the vertical axis is the skill cutoff 
for traded-sector workers in city 1, 1b . Note that 2b  coincide with w2, the non-traded 
sector wage rate in city 2. To determine how 1b  and 2b  will adjust when they deviate 
from the equilibrium levels, we construct two equilibrium curves. The first one traces 
the combination of 1b  and 2b  that clears the market for non-traded service 




demand for non-traded service workers, or excess employment demand EED, is 


























































To compute EDD all equilibrium conditions described by Eq (3-15) through Eq (3-25), 
except Eq (3-15) and Eq (3-21), are satisfied. The zero excess employment demand 
curve is thus defined by EED = 0. It is shown as the steeper curve in Figure 3-2. To the 
left of this curve, the non-traded service wage rate is too low, such that the supply of 
workers to the non-traded sector falls short of the demand (EED>0). As a result, the 
non-traded sector wage rate, hence 2b , will rise.  
 
The second equilibrium curve traces the combination of 1b  and 2b  that clears the 
housing market in city 1 and city 2. The housing market clearance requires the marginal 
traded-sector worker in city 1 to obtain the same utility that City 2 can offer, so as to be 
indifferent between the cities. We refer to this curve as “equal utility for marginal 
worker” curve. The utility difference between City 1 and City 2 for the marginal traded 









































Again, in computing UDM, all equilibrium conditions, Eq (3-15) through Eq (3-25), 
except Eq (3-15) and Eq (3-21), are satisfied. The equal marginal utility curve is thus 
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defined by MUD = 0. It is shown as the flatter curve in Figure 3-2. Below this curve, 
the marginal traded-sector worker in city 1 will find city 1 too expensive (hence offering 
a lower utility than city 2, MUD< 0) and thus prefer to move to city 2. As the middle-
skill marginal workers get pushed out of city 1, the skill cutoff for traded-sector workers 
in city 1 rises.  
 
Figure 3-2: Phase diagram for equilibrium skill cutoff points 
Notes: The model parameters are 4,L = , 
0.001F =  and  (which gives a skill Gini coefficient of 
approximately 0.3). 
 
The two equilibrium curves, the zero excess employment demand curve and equal 
marginal utility curve, divide the phase diagram into four regions, as shown in Figure 
3-2. In each region, 1b  and 2b  will change due to market adjustment, as indicated by 
the arrows. The phase diagram shows that 1b  and 2b  will converge to the intersection 
of the two equilibrium curves, which defines the equilibrium. 
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The phase diagram provides two important insights. First, there exists a unique 
asymmetric equilibrium, as long as the preference for consumer amenity variety is not 
too strong (σ not too small) in relation to housing supply elasticity (1/ρ not too large). 
Otherwise, city 1 will end up attracting everyone, and the equilibrium degenerates into 
a single-city outcome. Second, the asymmetric equilibrium is stable. Any deviation 
from the equilibrium skill cutoff combination 1b  and 2b  will be corrected by market 
adjustment. 
 
It can be shown that in equilibrium, total income from traded sector exactly covers the 
aggregate housing expenditure in each city: 
 ( )1,1 ,1
b
h h b







P Q L tk t dtα=    (3-27) 
These two equations are convenient for solving equilibrium, because together with Eq 
(3-24) and Eq (3-25) they determine housing prices and quantities based on two 
variables, 1b and 2b , only. Thus, for any initial values 1b  and 2b , we can determine 
housing price and quantity in each city. Then, we use Eq (3-17), Eq (3-18), Eq (3-19), 
and Eq (3-22) to solve two remaining unknowns, φ  and 1w . Subsequently, we 
calculate EED and MUD and adjust 1b  and 2b in the direction that reduces the 





3.5 Numerical Simulations 
Using the algorithm described above, we numerically solve the asymmetric equilibrium 
for a two-city economy. We present the baseline case in Table 3-1.In equilibrium City 
1 is more populous than City 2, attracts top skill traded-sector workers, offers a lower 
composite price index of non-traded services, has a higher housing price, and employs 
proportionally more workers in the non-traded sector. Unlike Gyourko, Mayer and 
Sinai (2013), where the superstar city is exclusive to high-income households, the 
equilibrium of our model entail the larger city (City 1) to have a wider spectrum of 
skills as documented in Eeckhout et al. (2010). 
 
Table 3-1: Two-city Asymmetric Equilibrium 
Main features City 1 City 2 
Population 2.0583 1.9417 
Traded-sector workers’ skill 2.3955-100 1.5199-2.3955 
Non-traded service 
employment 1.4558 0.9295 
Non-traded service wage 1.5855 1.5199 
Composite price index of non-
traded services 0.6514 0.6901 
Housing price 0.4042 0.3588 
Notes: The baseline case parameters are 4,L = , 




We next show how the equilibrium evolves as the aggregate skill disparity, indicated 
by the skill Gini coefficient, rises. We decrease the shape parameter of skill distribution 
such that its Gini coefficient increases from 0.3 to 0.6 (reflecting an increasing share of 
high-skill workers in the economy).The results are shown in Figure 3-3 through Figure 
3-10. As the skill Gini coefficient increases to 0.6, city 1 grows even bigger and 
accounts for 62% of total population, as opposed to 51% when Gini coefficient is 0.3. 
During this process, the skill cutoff for the traded-sector workers in city 1 also increases, 
indicating that middle-skill traded-sector workers are pushed to City 2. As shown in 
Figure 3-3, the skill cutoff for non-traded service sector also increases, indicating that 
least skilled traded-sector workers are switching to the non-traded sector to cater to an 
increasing demand for non-traded services. 
 
The employment share of service workers increases in both cities. Figure 3-4 shows the 
gain in non-traded service employment in the economy as a whole rise about 13 
percentage points (with a corresponding loss of employment share by the traded goods 
sector) as the skill Gini coefficient doubles from 0.3. Interestingly, since 1960 U.S. 
manufacturing employment share declined by about 15 percentage points(Baily & 
Bosworth, 2014) as income Gini coefficient rose from 0.35 to 0.45. The results of our 
model suggest that the loss of low-skill manufacturing jobs in the U.S. is not entirely 
due to competition from China; growing domestic demand for non-traded services 




Figure 3-5 shows that, as the aggregate skill inequality increases, City 1 becomes more 
attractive in terms of the variety of local consumer amenities it can offer. The 
composition price index of non-traded services in City 1 over than in City 2 declines 
from 0.94 when the skill Gini is 0.3 to 0.90 as the skill Gini rise to 0.6. The housing 
price premium in City 1 increases from 12% to 32%. Figure 3-6 shows that house price 
dispersion and city population size dispersion both increases with aggregate skill 
inequality. 
 
Figure 3-3: Skill cutoffs for city 1 and service employments over 
skill Gini coefficient 
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Figure 3-4: Share of service workers over skill Gini coefficient 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Service price discount and housing price premium in city 1 
over skill Gini coefficient 
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Figure 3-6: Standard deviation of city population and housing price 
over skill Gini coefficient 
 
To explore the welfare implications of aggregate skill inequality for workers at different 
skill levels, we depict the utility paths of workers at skill level 1, 2, 4 and 8, respectively, 
in Figure 3-7 through Figure 3-10.The red lines in the figures represent the utility that 
workers can obtain working in the traded-good sector in city 1. The blue lines represent 
the utility offered by the traded-sector employment in city 2. The green lines represent 
the utility offered by non-traded service sector (in either city). Workers will choose the 
occupation and city that offer the highest utility. 
 
As shown in Figure 3-7, the bottom-skill workers will always be employed in the non-
traded service sector. Their welfare increases as the aggregate skill inequality rises. 
Workers at skill level 2 are employed in the traded sector in City 2 when the aggregate 
skill inequality is low, as shown in Figure 3-8. Ata skill Gini coefficient of 0.45, these 
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workers find it profitable to switch to employment in the non-traded service sector. 
Their welfare initially declines as the aggregate skill inequality rises and then improves 
with the aggregate skill inequality after they switch to employment in the non-traded 
sector.  
 
Figure 3-9 and Figure 3-10 display the welfare paths for workers at skill level 4 and 8, 
who always work in the traded sector. Their welfare always declines with aggregate 
skill inequality. The middle-skill traded-sector workers enjoy City 1 when aggregate 
skill inequality is low and are pushed to City 2 when the aggregate skill inequality 
becomes sufficiently high. The high-skill traded-sector workers always choose City 1. 
 
Figure 3-7: Utility of workers at skill level 1 





















Produce Traded Goods in City 1





Figure 3-8: Utility of workers at skill level 2 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Utility of workers at skill level 4 
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Figure 3-10: Utility of workers at skill level 8 
 
In general, low-skill workers, who always choose employment in the non-traded sectors, 
always benefit from increased aggregate skill inequality, which elevates the demand for 
non-traded services. Low-skill traded sector workers are harmed by increased aggregate 
skill inequality initially but then benefit from it after they eventually move to the non-
traded sector. Workers at the middle and high skill levels, who never find non-traded 
service employment to their advantage, are always harmed by an increase in aggregate 
skill inequality, which pushes up the labor cost of non-traded services. The middle-skill 
workers tend to lose more because they eventually also get pushed out of City 1, which 
offer more attractive consumer amenities. Thus, the welfare impact of rising aggregate 
skill inequality across the skill spectrum is U-shaped (more accurately, left-tilted L-
shaped), as shown in Figure 3-11.  
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Figure 3-11: The welfare impact of rising aggregate skill Gini 
coefficient from 0.3 to 0.6 
 
We further explore the effect of preference for consumer amenity variety and housing 
supply elasticity on spatial equilibrium outcomes. We examine two alternative 
scenarios. First, we reduce the consumer taste for non-traded service variety by 
increasing σ from 7 (baseline value) to 8. Second, we reduce the housing supply 
elasticity by increasing ρ  from 0.5 (baseline value) to 0.75 (corresponding to a 
median housing supply elasticity across US cities reported by Saiz (2010)). The results 
are presented in Table 3-2. Column 1 shows the simulation results for the baseline 
scenario. Each cell displays two numbers, corresponding to the outcome associated 
with a skill Gini coefficient of 0.3 (top number) and a skill Gini coefficient of 0.6 
(bottom number), respectively. Column 2 and 3 show the simulation results for the 
alternative scenarios. 
 























At a weaker preference for consumer amenity variety, the composite price of non-traded 
services becomes higher in both cities in comparison with the baseline case. City 1 
becomes smaller, as the lower-skill traded-sector workers no longer find the consumer 
amenity benefit in City 1 sufficiently attractive to justify the higher housing price in 
City 1. As City 1 share of worker population decline, its advantage in offering better 
local consumer amenity also declined, reflected by the convergence of its composite 
non-traded service price towards that of City 2. Housing price dispersion between the 
cities also decrease. Non-traded sector employment does not change much, as the effect 
of reduced demand on productivity is compensated by increased production scale for 
each of the smaller set of non-traded services. The difference in non-traded sector 
employment between City 1 and City 2, however, narrows. Total housing expenditure 
in the economy (an income leakage to friction) does not change much, although City 
1’s share of that decreases. The welfare diminishes for everyone because of the higher 
composite price of non-traded services. Moreover, the welfare inequality diminishes as 
the higher composite price of non-traded services hurt high-income workers more than 
low-income workers. Finally, we find that widening aggregate skill inequality has a 
smaller impact on the dispersion of mean skill level, composite non-traded service price, 
housing price, and population size across the cities.  
 
Table 3-2: Comparative Static Analysis: Asymmetric Equilibrium
Column 1 2 3 
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Scenario Baseline 8σ =  0.75ρ =  
Skill cutoff for traded-sector workers 
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Utility of workers at different skill levels 



























Notes: The baseline case parameters are 4,L = , 
.The top number in each cell corresponds to the case of skill 
Gini=0.3, the bottom number, the case of skill Gini=0.6. 
 
At a lower housing supply elasticity, 0.75ρ = , City 1 becomes more exclusive to 
higher-skill traded-sector workers, and its population share in the economy diminishes 
compared to the baseline case. The composite non-traded service price in City 2 
decreases, and so does City 1’s advantage in the composite price, as the demand for 
non-traded services is reduced by higher housing prices and housing expenditure 
leakage in the economy. The non-traded sector wage rate decreases, and so does the 
employment share of the non-traded service sector. Although the dispersion in mean 
skill level increases somewhat (at a low skill Gini coefficient), the dispersion in 
composite non-traded service price, housing price, and population size all decrease. 
Welfare for everyone is diminished due to higher housing expenditure (leakage). Again 
we note that widening aggregate skill inequality has a smaller impact on the dispersion 
of mean skill level, composite non-traded service price, housing price, and population 
size across the cities. This last result is in marked contrast with the result in Gyourko, 
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Mayer and Sinai (2013), where more restrictive housing supply in a city helps 
strengthening its superstar-city status. In our case, more restrictive housing supply is an 




We have presented a model to show asymmetric spatial equilibrium can emerge across 
perfectly symmetry locations in the presence of increasing returns in local consumer 
amenities and non-homothetic preferences for such amenities. Both premises are 
supported by empirical evidence recently documented in the literature. The model can 
account for widened housing price dispersion across cities solely by increased 
aggregate skill inequality (or increased share of high-skill workers) in the economy. A 
larger share of high-skill workers reinforces the increasing returns in local consumer 
amenities and income segregation among traded-sector workers across cities. The 
model helps sharpening an important insight in Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2013) but 
also clarifying the effect of local housing supply elasticity on asymmetric equilibrium 
outcome: restrictive housing supply may make the “superstar” city more exclusive but 
would moderate, rather than exacerbate, housing price dispersion across cities when 
aggregate skill inequality rises. This clarification has important policy implications—
expanding housing supply in a “superstar” city can have unintended consequence of 




More importantly, our model builds on a micro foundation that can be calibrated to 
quantify the contribution of aggregate skill inequality to housing price dispersion 
observed in a real economy. In addition, our model can also account for the rise of the 
employment share of non-traded service sector resulting from increased aggregate skill 
inequality, a significant feature of many economies like the US. Related to the impact 
of aggregate skill inequality on employment structure, our model reveals that widening 
aggregate skill inequality can benefit low-skill workers due to increased demand for 
non-traded services, which low-skill workers generally have a comparative advantage 
in producing. Moreover, the welfare gain of the low-skill non-traded service workers is 
at the expense of high-skill traded-sector workers, who, although enjoying a greater 
variety of non-traded services in the presence of a larger share of high-skill workers in 
the economy, nevertheless have to pay higher labor cost for each variety of non-traded 
services. 
 
Our model can be extended to incorporate local agglomeration economies in the traded-
sector employment and to cases with more than two locations (to study more realistic 








The past three decades witnessed a resurgence of big cities in US and many developed 
economies driven by the growing demand for urban amenities like museums, 
restaurants and concerts (e.g. Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006). What are the implications of 
the amenity-based urban agglomeration for the spatial structure and land-use efficiency 
of cities? We address the question using a monocentric-city model, where residents 
travel to the city center to consume amenities, which are produced locally with 
economies of scale.  
 
The city is populated with workers with heterogeneous skills, who are employed either 
to produce a traded good at home and earn a wage according to their skill level, or to 
produce amenities at the city center and earn a wage according to the local demand. 
Workers consume the numeraire traded good, amenities, and housing, with the demand 
for amenities increasing with income. In equilibrium, low-skill workers choose to 
produce amenities and, when the commuting cost is not sufficiently high, live in the 
intermediate zone from the city center. High-skill workers live in the central zone to 
save the cost of their frequent trips to consume amenities and middle-skill workers in 




We show that, under monopolistic pricing of the amenities, innovations raising amenity 
quality would make the city more compact as a result of increased demand for traveling 
to the city center to consume amenities. Moreover, the competitive commercial rent at 
the city center, which sustains the monopolistic pricing of amenities, results in 
excessive rationing of amenity demand, urban sprawl, and a deadweight loss of welfare. 
 
Keywords: monocentric city model; skill disparity; income sorting; house price 
premium; increasing return; taste for variety; efficiency; social welfare 
 





In past decades, US economy witnesses a rising economic status of the service sector. 
From 1950 to 2010, the share of consumption by Americans devoted to service goods 
has increased significantly from 40 percent to 65 percent (Timo Boppart, 2014). The 
booming development of service sector mirrors a decline in the manufacturing sector. 
The employment in manufacturing sector not only fall dramatically in a relative sense 
but also in absolute numbers (Baily & Bosworth, 2014; D. Lee & Wolpin, 2006). 
 
Glaeser et al. (2001) document the rise of "consumer city", where the rich workers live 
in the central city, even though they work in suburbs. The trend is likely to continue 
because the demographic changes in U.S. also work in favor of the majority's choice 
for consumer city: smaller households, later marriages, decisions not to have babies, 
the emergence of a huge and active baby boom population in its sixties and seventies 
(Ehrenhalt, 2012). All these changes generate more households who are willing to live 
in a smaller house in a central location to enjoy urban life. 
 
Despite the observed trend that service sector is gaining its importance in the economy 
and that people's location preference is shifting to central city that can provide more 
options for non-traded services, no theoretical studies explore its implications for the 
internal structure of city and resource allocation efficiency in the city. To fill this 
research gap, we develop a monocentric city model to explore the economics of 




We assume that the non-traded services are produced and consumed in a single central 
location, referred to as Central Commercial District, or CCD. This assumption captures 
positive externalities in non-traded service consumption, which arise from access to 
diversity by consumers when the services are concentrated in one location. 
Heterogeneous workers that are differentiated by skill level, earn income from 
employment either in the traded good sector or the non-traded service sector. Worker 
productivity in the former sector depends on skill but not location, whereas in the latter 
sector, worker’s wage depends on aggregate local demand but not skill. A fixed cost is 
required for the production of local service, which rises with service quality, giving rise 
to increasing return to local demand. Workers derive their utility from the consumption 
of a numéraire traded good, housing, and non-traded services. The preferences are non-
homothetic such that the demand for non-traded services is income elastic. The non-
traded service employments are assumed to concentrate at the city center, referred to as 
a Central Commercial District (CCD), due to positive externalities in non-traded service 
consumption. There is a single CCD landlord, who tenders the space out to a 
commercial service operator capable of paying the highest land rent. We assume service 
workers travel to work in the CCD and pay a commuting cost that linearly increases 
with distance to CCD, to capture the "U" shape income profile with respect to distance 
to the CCD observed in major US cities. Consumers travel to the CCD to purchase 
services. On each trip, a consumer purchases one unit of service goods and pays a travel 
cost that linearly increases with distance to the CCD. In equilibrium, low-skill workers 
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choose non-traded service occupation according to comparative advantage. High-skill 
traded-sector workers live in the central city to share the location with better access to 
local services and higher land rent, low-skill service workers occupy the region adjunct 
to the central city, while middle-skill traded-sector workers live in the suburban area 
with the worst access to non-traded services and lowest housing price. Hence, from the 
city center to city boundary, resident's income first decreases and then increase. 
Similarly, a U-shaped relation between resident's income and distance to the city center 
exists in many large US cities, as documented in previous literature (Glaeser et al., 
2008).  
 
By raising upper bound of skill distribution, we conduct a range of counterfactual 
experiments to understand the effect of increasing skill inequality on the spatial 
structure, economic structure of consumer city and social welfare. Our model shows 
that increasing skill dispersion will enhance gentrification at city center. More high-
skill traded-sector workers will move into the central city, pushing middle-skill traded-
sector workers to the suburbs. The bid rent curve of housing price will also become 
steeper at city center, indicating that housing price premium at city center will increase.  
 
Also, as the dispersion of population skill increases, the city will convert to an economy 
that is more oriented by the non-traded service sector. First, non-traded service firm will 
improve the quality of its product to meet the growing demand for high-quality services, 
stemming from the increasing numbers of high-skill workers. Second, consumers will 
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spend a greater share of their income on non-traded services, accompanied by a 
decrease in the share of expenditure on housing goods and traded goods. Third, a higher 
proportion of the total population will work in the service sector, featuring some 
middle-skill traded-sector workers will convert to produce non-traded services, driven 
by greater aggregate demand for non-traded services. 
 
Our model also predicts that increased population skill dispersion do less harm to the 
non-traded service workers, who have little skills. While all workers in the city suffer 
from rising housing price in the central city, the low-skill service workers are partially 
compensated by rising wage, driven by increasing demand. In a city with more elastic 
housing supply and lower travel costs for service consumers, the high-skill traded-
sector workers will suffer relatively less from rising skill dispersion. It happens because 
the housing price in the central city will remain relatively constant, even when total 
demand for housing increases. Also, when travel costs are low, the high-skill workers 
can substitute the non-traded service for housing consumption. 
 
One of our main goals is to examine the resource allocation efficiency of the consumer 
city. We find that, when the city maximizes the aggregate commercial land rent in the 
CCD, the non-traded services are priced above the marginal production costs. 
Maximizing commercial land rent in the CCD is associated with a deadweight loss and 
it causes inefficiency in resource allocation--the share of employments in the non-
traded service sector is below social optimal level and dispersed urban structure 
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generates more frictions. Hence, we argue that the government should use the marginal-
cost pricing regime by regulating the price of services and subsidizing the fixed costs 
changed on the service producer. By adopting the marginal-cost pricing regime, the 
government can encourage switch of the employments from traded goods sector to the 
non-traded service sector. Also, when consumption amenities are improved, the urban 
structure will become more compact, hence, associated with lower urban frictions. 
When the government adopts the marginal-cost pricing regime, all workers will 
experience welfare gains. But the policy will generate fewer benefits to the middle-skill 
traded-sector workers. It is because the middle-skill traded-sector workers do not 
experience a wage growth as what happens to the low-skill workers and they are 
constrained in the budget to take advantage of the lower service price. 
 
The present study is related to the literature documenting the rise of “consumer city”. 
Glaeser et al. (2001) show that the cities with attractive non-traded services experience 
faster population growth and that educated and wealthy households choose to live in 
the central city, even when they work in suburbs. Previous studies also show that the 
mix of non-traded services is closely associated with the preference of local consumers 
(Handbury, 2013; Waldfogel, 2008). Consistently, our model predicts that, when the 
number of high-income households increases in the consumer city, quality of non-
traded services will also be improved. Hence, our finding recalls the idea of "preference 
externalities" that, when a product's provision entails fixed costs, it will be made 
available only if a sufficient number of people want it(Waldfogel, 2008). Previous 
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studies document that gentrification creates new jobs in non-traded service sectors 
(Lester & Hartley, 2014; Schuetz, Kolko, & Meltzer, 2012). Our model agrees with this 
argument and predicts that, as the dispersion of skill increases, gentrification will be 
enhanced, and a greater proportion of the population will work in the non-traded service 
sector. 
 
Holian & Kahn (2013) shows that high-quality-of-life consumer cities are more likely 
to be low-carbon cities. They emphasize the importance of an attractive CBD in 
encouraging residents to visit and spend time in the center city, thus using more public 
transportation and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Consistent with their results, our 
model predicts that higher quality of non-traded services is more sustainable in a city 
with a small commuting cost for non-traded service workers. Our model highlights that 
better public transportation system will induce the rise of high-quality "consumer city" 
through reducing the labor cost for service firms. When the commuting cost for the 
low-skill worker is lower, the service firm can pay a lower wage to the service workers. 
Hence, the service firm can hire a greater amount of low-skill service workers to 
improve the quality of non-traded service. Our model emphasizes the importance of 
enhancing the mobility of low-skill workers in creating an attractive consumer city. 
 
From the theoretical perspective, our study is rooted in the traditional literature on 
monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964b; Mills, 1967; R. Muth, 1969) by emphasizing 
the tradeoff between access to the CBD and housing expenditure. Transitional models 
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study resource allocation regarding housing and commuting in a "manufacturing city" 
setting, where all employment is in the traded goods sector and located at the city center. 
In this context, economic agents concentrate to form a city to make use of 
agglomeration economics in traded goods sector. But, the present paper emphasizes the 
idea of “consumer city" and examine a different set of tradeoffs when agglomeration 
economics is derived from the non-traded service sector and when the size of the sector 
is endogenously determined by local demand. 
 
Our study is also related to the literature that focuses on income-residential pattern 
within a city. Previous studies consider how income affects the valuation of land, leisure 
foregone in commuting, access to amenities and access to public transportation, all of 
which contribute to determining the residential location (Brueckner et al., 1999; Glaeser 
et al., 2008; Rappaport, 2014; Wheaton, 1974). In particular, our paper is closely related 
to the study of Bruckner, Thisse, and Zenou (1999). Their study highlights the 
importance of exogenous amenities in determining residential location by income 
groups. Different from their study, we focus on consumption amenities that are 
endogenously created by the interaction between the tastes of high-skill workers and 
the labor supply of low-skill workers. Therefore, our model allows us to better 
understand the relation between skill inequality and consumption amenities in a unified 
framework. Also, the present theory rationalizes a non-monotonic relationship between 
resident income and distance to the city center, which is observed in old large US cities 




Our study is also associated with the recent studies that explore the implications of 
social interactions for urban structure. Helsley and Zenou (2014) present a monocentric 
city model to explore the implications of consumers' centrality in the social network for 
their physical locations in the city. The authors show that the consumers who are more 
central in the social network will live closer to the city center, provided that these 
consumers benefit more from social interactions. Different from their study, we think 
about workers of heterogeneous skills who sort within city according to their 
preferences for non-traded services. Helsley and Zenou (2014) assume that all social 
interactions occur at a single central location, and the present study assumes that 
production and consumption of non-traded services only occur at a single central 
location. 
 
Our study is also related to the literature on club theory (Ng & Weisser, 1974; 
Scotchmer, 1985, 2002). The literature has two important insights. First, in the presence 
of externalities, it is efficient to price the club goods at marginal social cost and finance 
fixed cost of the club by collecting membership fees. Second, to maximize the 
participation of club members, it is optimal to collect higher membership fee from the 
consumers who have higher willingness to pay. In our model, the consumer city is a 
club where consumers cluster to share the fixed cost of non-traded services. Consumer 
purchases a house to acquire the membership of the club and pay additional service 
price and travel cost as a usage fee. Through choosing residential locations, 
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heterogeneous agents will reveal their preference for the non-traded services. In 
equilibrium, the consumers with stronger preference purchase more expensive houses 
closer to the CCD, hence paying higher membership fees. Also, in the presence of 
pecuniary externalities, we argue that variable cost and fixed cost of the non-traded 
service sector should be financed separately. By adopting a marginal-cost pricing 
regime, the government can correct the distortion in resource allocation and improve 
social welfare. 
 
Our model is presented in section (4.2). We discuss the properties of equilibrium in 
section (4.3). We characterize the equilibrium in section (4.4) and show the existence 
of equilibrium by construction in section (4.5). We present a baseline scenario in section 
(4.6). Counterfactual experiments are shown in section (4.7). We discuss welfare 
distribution in section (4.8). Discussion on efficiency is presented in section (4.9). 
Section (4.10) concludes.  
 
4.2 The Model 
We consider a linear monocentric city2. Land of the city is represented by a segment on 
the positive real line that the boundary is endogenously determined. Within city 
boundary, the land is occupied for residential use and beyond the boundary is for 
                                                 
2 The model can also be extended to plain geography, like in Lucas and Rossi–Hansberg (2002). We leave it for 
our future work.  
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agriculture use. Absentee landlords own the city land. There is a Central Commercial 
District (CCD) in the city and its location is exogenous. Location of any place in the 
city is described by its distance to the CCD, x . Population in the city is exogenous. 
Workers are heterogeneous regarding skill b  that is distributed according to a 
probability density function ( )k b . 
4.2.1 Consumption 
Workers consume three types of goods: traded goods, non-traded services, and housing. 
Consumer's preference is given by indirect utility,  
 
1 ,1 0, 0, 0/ /
I PV
G q G q
ε γβ
υ ε γ β υ
ε γ
   
= − + > > > > >          (4-1) 
where I  is disposable income, G  is the price of non-traded services, q  is the 
quality of non-traded services, P  is the composite price for traded goods and housing 
goods defined by, 
 ( )
1 11 h XP P Pαα α αα α −− −= −   (4-2) 
where Ph  is housing price and PX  is the price of tradable goods. We normalize PX  
to one. Because (4-2) corresponds to a sub-utility of Cobb-Douglas form, the 
expenditure share of housing goods is relatively constant to that of traded goods, which 
equals  . Consumers have a taste for service quality and they care about quality-
adjusted service price, /G q . 
 
The specified indirect utility function is a subclass of price independent generalized 
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linearity (PIGL) preferences rooted in Muellbauer (1975, 1976). If we neglect the 
quality, the utility function includes homothetic preferences as special cases. If 














IV 1 . Lemma 1 shows that function (4-1) satisfies the 















Proof. See Appendix 
 
CCD is the center for production and consumption of non-traded services. Service 
workers go to work in the CCD, and they pay a commuting cost that linearly increases 
with the distance between their home and the CCD. Hence, disposable income for a 
service worker living at the location x  is given by w xτ− , where w  is wage for 
service worker and τ  is commuting cost per unit of distance. 
 
Consumers travel to the CCD to purchase non-traded services. On each trip to the CCD, 
a consumer purchases one unit of service goods and pays a travel cost that linearly 
increases with her distance to the CCD. Hence, the total cost for one unit of services, 
inclusive of travel costs, is G kx+ . We elaborate the indirect utility function by 
accounting for commuting cost and travel costs. Consumer preference is given by,  
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   
= − +   
+ +      (4-3) 
where I w xτ= −  for service workers, I b=  for traded-sector workers and, 
 ( )
1 11 h XP P Pαα α αα α −− −= −   (4-4) 
By Roy identity, we derive demand function for services,  
 
( ), , , , 1S h I G kx qPQ I P G q x G kx qI G kx
ε γ
β  +  = −    + +       (4-5) 
and for housing goods,  
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Parameter ε  determines the degree of non-homotheticity of consumer's utility and 
1 ε−  is the income elasticity of demand for housing goods and for traded goods. The 
price elasticity of housing demand is 1αγ − . Income elasticity of service demand is 
given by, 
1
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that is positive, if ε γ> . 
4.2.2 Production 
4.2.2.1 Traded goods sector 
There are N  individuals in the economy and each individual has one unit of labor, but 
different skill b , that is distributed according to a density function ( )k b . Production 
of traded goods only requires skills as inputs and it subjects to constant return to scale. 
Traded worker's skill b  is equivalent to her productivity in the sector. 
 
4.2.2.2 Non-traded service sector 
Non-traded services are only provided at the Central Commercial District (CCD), 
because of the positive externalities in providing non-traded services. The externalities 
arise, because social interaction is a key component of non-traded services. For example, 
concerts and entertainment shows are best enjoyed with a large audience.  
 
There is a single landlord, who tenders the CCD to the service operator that is capable 
of paying the highest commercial rent. The production of non-traded services requires 
a fixed labor cost, F . The fixed cost can be in the form of employment training, setting 
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up necessary equipment and shops, or obtaining necessary business licenses. Besides, 
producing each unit of service output also requires a constant marginal labor input m . 
Therefore, total labor cost of producing SQ  units of services is given by, 
 Sl mQ F= +    (4-7) 
The producer could invest to improve service quality q . High quality requires high 
fixed input, 
 ( ) , 0, 0F q qζδ δ ζ= > >    (4-8) 
 
In our model, we allow for labor specialization. Workers choose their employment 
sector to make the best use of their talents. By comparative advantage a la Roy (1951), 
high-skill workers will specialize in producing traded goods and the low-skill worker 
will specialize in producing non-traded services. In equilibrium, there is a marginal 
worker indifferent between two sectors. The workers, whose skill is higher than the 
marginal worker, will produce traded goods, and the workers, whose skill is lower, will 
produce non-traded services.  
 
Our model setting is equivalent to that is used in monopolistic competition (Krugman, 
1991). In the framework of monopolistic competition, consumers have a preference for 
varieties. Composite price index decreases with the number of available varieties in the 




Production of housing goods H  takes land input, L  and capital input, C ,  
 
1 ,0 1H L Cμ μ μ−= < <   (4-9) 
Capital is traded on the global market at a constant price, cR . Given Cobb-Douglas 
technology, the production cost per unit of housing goods is,  
( ) 1 11 L cR Rμμ μ μμ μ −− −−  
where LR  is the land price. Because housing sector is perfectly competitive, firms earn 
zero profit. Hence, housing price must equals production cost,  
 ( )
1 11h L cP R Rμμ μ μμ μ −− −= −    (4-10) 
Rearranging the equation, we find that land price LR  is driven by housing price hP ,  
 ( ) ( )
1/ 1/1 1(1 )L h cR P R
μ μμ μ μμ μ − −= −   (4-11) 
Given the supply of land L, housing supply SH  is determined by,  
 ( ) ( ) ( )






= −   (4-12) 
Price elasticity of housing supply is 1 / 1μ − . If μ  is lower, housing construction will 
be less constrained by the inelastic land supply, therefore, housing supply will be more 
sensitive to changes of housing price. 
 
4.3 Properties of Equilibrium 




Definition of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium for a population N with skill distribution ݃(ܾ) is a list of quantities 
ሼܳ௦(ܾ), ܳ௛(ܾ), ܳ௑(ܾ)ሽ , prices ሼݓ, ܩ, ௛ܲ(ݔ), ܴ(ݔ)ሽ , service quality q, worker’s 
location choice ܾ(ݔ), skill cutoff ܾଶ for service workers, such that, 
(i) service firm maximizes its profit; 
(ii) all consumers optimize (inclusive of employment choice, consumption choice and 
residential location choice); 
(iii) service market, labor market, housing market and land market are all clear. 
 
To demonstrate the properties of equilibrium, we first examine how traded-sector 
workers choose their residential locations in equilibrium. Because non-traded services 
are luxury goods, high-income traded-sector workers spend a greater proportion of their 
income on services. Hence, the high-skill traded-sector workers are more willing to pay 
for the central location that is close to service provider. As long as income elasticity of 
service demand is greater than that of housing demand, high-skill traded-sector workers 
will always choose to live closer to the CCD. The Lemma I formalizes this result. 
 
Lemma II (Spatial sorting of traded-sector workers) 
If income elasticity of non-traded service is greater than that of housing, for traded-
sector worker i with skill ܾ௜ at location ݔ௜, i=j, k, if and only if, ௝ܾ > ܾ௞, that  ݔ௝ <
ݔ௞. 




Because service workers must pay a commuting cost to work in city center, their 
willingness to pay for the central location is higher than the least skilled traded-sector 
workers. Hence, middle-skill traded-sector workers will occupy the suburban area and 
the least-skilled traded-sector worker will live at city boundary. When commuting cost 
for service workers is not sufficiently high, the benefits from saving commuting costs 
for low-skill service workers will be lower than the consumption benefits that high-skill 
traded-sector workers will receive from living at central location. Hence, high-skill 
traded-sector workers will have higher willingness to pay for the central location. In 
equilibrium, high-skill traded worker will occupy the central region, the middle-skill 
traded worker will live in suburban region, and the service workers will live in 
intermediate region. The Proposition II formalizes this result. 
 
Proposition I (spatial structure of a consumer city) 
If commuting cost is positive, i.e., ߬ > 0, but not sufficiently high, 
(i) the least-skilled traded-sector workers (denoted by ܾଶ ) live at city boundary 
(denoted by ݔଷ); 
(ii) city center is occupied by most skilled traded-sector workers (denoted by തܾ); there 
exists a cutoff skill ܾଵ < തܾ, and distance cutoff ݔଵ and ݔଶ, such that traded-sector 
workers with skill [ܾଵ, തܾ] live in the area [0, ݔଵ]; service workers live in the area 
[ݔଵ, ݔଶ]; 
(iii) wage received by the least-skilled traded-sector worker is higher than the wage 
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received by service workers, i.e., ܾଵ > ݓ. 
Proof. See the Appendix 
 
Proposition I shows that income of resident is non-monotonic in distance to the city 
center. The income of resident first decreases, and then increases with distance to the 
CCD. We summarize the findings of Proposition I in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1: Skill sorting of heterogeneous workers in city 
 
The spatial sorting of heterogeneous agents has two implications for the efficiency of 
resource allocation. First, sorting of the high-skill workers to central location helps to 
reduce urban frictions, because the consumers that travel more frequently live closer to 
the CCD. Second, the skill sorting of heterogeneous workers mimics the optimal two-
part tariff for club goods. In our model, the consumer city is a club where consumers 
cluster to share the fixed cost of non-traded services. Each consumer purchases a house 
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to acquire the membership of the club and pay additional service price and travel cost 
as a usage fee. Through choosing residential locations, heterogeneous agents will reveal 
their preference for the non-traded services. In equilibrium, the consumers with stronger 
preference purchase more expensive houses closer to the CCD, hence paying higher 
membership fees. 
4.4 Characterization of Equilibrium  
In this section, we characterize equilibrium of our economy. From Proposition I, we 
know that city can be divided into three areas, hence, we consider each area in sequence.  
4.4.1 Housing market clearing in central area 
We first consider central area [ ]10,x x∈ . Because traded-sector workers' residential 
locations depend on their skills, we denote skill of traded-sector workers that live at 
location x  by ( )b x . Housing demand of traded-sector workers with skill ( )b x  is 
given by,  
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
h
b x P x qG kxh b x
P x b x q G kx
ε γ
αβ    +
=      +     (4-13) 
Service demand of traded-sector workers with skill ( )b x  is given by, 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )1b x P x qG kxs b x
G kx b x q G kx
ε γ
β
    + = −     + +       (4-14) 
Between location x  and x dx+ , we will find individuals with skill between ( )b x  
and ( ) ( )db xb x dx
dx
+ . The density of residents with skill between ( )b x  and 
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( ) ( )db xb x dx
dx
+  is ( )( )g b x . Hence, the aggregate housing demand at location x  is 
given by,  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )DH x hg b x Ndb x=   (4-15) 
Because supply of land between location x  and x dx+  is dx , supply of housing is 
given by, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







= −   (4-16) 
If housing market clears at location x , the total housing supply ( )SH x  must equal the 
total demand ( )DH x , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )







− =   (4-17) 
where h  is individual housing demand. 
Therefore, high-skill traded-sector workers' location choice must satisfy the following 
condition,  
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From (4-18) and (4-19), we obtain a system of differential equations for two unknown 
functions ( )b x  and ( )hP x . Because the most skilled traded-sector workers live at city 
center, we have boundary condition, 
 ( )0b b=   (4-20) 
Suppose housing price at city center is 0R , we have boundary condition,  
 ( ) 00hP R=   (4-21) 
Conditional on knowing 0R , we can solve this system of differential equations. We are 
able to know the skill of residents at any location and housing price at that location. 
Suppose we also know 1b , we can also use ( )b x  to evaluate 1x , 
 ( )11 1x b b−=   (4-22) 
We can also evaluate housing price at location 1x , 
 ( )1 1hR P x=   (4-23) 
Later, we will discuss how 0R  and 1b  are endogenously determined in equilibrium. 
4.4.2 Housing market clearing in intermediate area 
Then, we consider intermediate area [ ]1 2,x x x∈  where service workers live. In general, 
within the group of service workers, our model remains exactly the same as a traditional 
monocentric model with homogeneous agents, such that the results are pinned down by 




The utility of service workers is determined by service wage w  and housing price at 




( )1 w x q P x qu




−   
= −   + +     (4-24) 
In a moment, we will discuss how service wage w  is endogenously determined in 
equilibrium. Because service workers are indifferent among locations in the area 
[ ]1 2,x x , they receive utility u  at any location x . Hence, 
 
( ) ( )1 w x q P x qu




−   
= −   
+ +      (4-25) 
Hence, 
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1 1
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− = −      + + + +         (4-26) 
Housing price at an arbitrary location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  can be pinned down as,  
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(4-27) 
and price of composite goods at the location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  is given by, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
11 hP x P xαα αα α −−= −   (4-28) 
Hence, housing demand of individual service worker at location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  is given 
by,  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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w x P x qG kxh x






=     
− +     (4-29) 
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Furthermore, aggregate housing demand at location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  is given by,  
 ( ) ( ) ( )D servH x h x g x dx=   (4-30) 
where ( )servg x  is population density of service workers at the location x . 
Aggregate housing supply at location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  is given by, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







= −   (4-31) 
Housing market clearing at location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  implies that, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







= −   (4-32) 
Hence, population density of service workers at location [ ]1 2,x x x∈  can be pinned 
down as, 
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Because service workers occupy the area, total population in area [ ]1 2,x x x∈  must 
equal to population of service workers, 





N k t dt g t dt=    (4-34) 
The equation (4-35) defines a mapping between 2b  and 2x . Conditional on knowing
2b , we can find 2x  by solving equation (4-36). Furthermore, we can evaluate housing 
price at location 2x  by using (4-28),  
( ) ( )
1/
2 11 2 1
2
2 1 1
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This is useful for our purpose of finding the solutions for equilibrium.  
 
4.4.3 Housing market clearing in suburban area 
For suburban area [ ]2 3,x x x∈ , we have the same set of differential equations as area 
[ ]10,x x∈  that describe evolving housing price and skills across locations, 
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                                                                (4-39) 
Because traded-sector workers with skill 1b  lives at location 2x , we have boundary 
condition, 
 ( )2 1b x b=   (4-40) 
Suppose we also know housing price at location 2x , we have boundary condition, 
 ( )2 2hP x R=   (4-41) 
After solving this system, we can evaluate city boundary 3x  by using ( )b x , 
 ( )13 2x b b−=   (4-42) 
And find the housing price 3R  at city boundary 3x , 
 ( )3 3hR P x=   (4-43) 
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4.4.4 Utility equalization conditions 
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(4-44) 
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Substitute u  by (4-19), we have, 




1 1 3 3
( )1 1
/ / / /
P xw x P x b
G kx q G kx q G kx q G kx q
ε γ ε γ
τ β β
ε γ ε γ
       
−
− = −       
+ + + +         
(4-46)  
4.4.5 Non-traded service market and land market clearing 
Market of non-traded services must clear. Aggregate labor supply of service workers 
must equal to aggregate labor demand. To account for this condition, we need to 
consider aggregate service demand in each area. The aggregate service demand in area 
[ ]10,x x∈  is given by,  
 ( )






G kb t qP ttQ N dt





   + = −      + +    

  (4-47) 
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For area [ ]1 2,x x x∈ , the aggregate service demand is given by,  
 ( )





qP xw x G kxQ g x dx
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
  (4-48) 
For area [ ]2 3,x x x∈ , the aggregate service demand is given by,  
 ( )
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   + = −      + +    

  (4-49) 
Service market clearing requires that, 
 





N g t dt c Q qξδ
=
= +   (4-50) 
Last, land market must also clear. At city boundary, the residential land price must equal 
agriculture land price. From (4-11), it must be satisfied that, 
 ( ) ( )
1/ 1/1 1
3(1 )agr cR R R
μ μμ μ μμ μ − −= −   (4-51) 
 
4.4.6 Service producer’s optimization problem 
The service producer has perfect information and chooses service price G  and service 
quality q  to maximize the profit, π , 
S SQ G Q wm wFπ = − −  
where, 
F qζδ=   
The first-order condition for service price G  is given by, 
 
0S SS S
Q Q w wQ G wm mQ F
G G G G G
π ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
= + − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   (4-52) 
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and for service quality q, 
 
0S S S
Q Q w w dFG wm mQ F w
q q q q q dq
π ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
= − − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   (4-53) 
First-order condition (4-52) and (4-53) jointly determine the optimal choice of service 
price and quality. 
 
We rearrange (4-52) and find it has straightforward intuition, 
S S
S S
Q Q w wQ G wm mQ F
G G G G
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
+ = + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
If the producer asks for dG  units of higher price, it has to account for two effects on 
revenue. First, its revenue increases by SQ dG  because it asks for a higher price for 






∂ . In total, the additional revenue from asking for higher 
price is given by, 
S
S S S
QQ dG GdQ Q G dG
G
∂ 
+ = + ∂  . 
Besides, the producer must also consider two effects of higher price on production cost. 
First, because aggregate service demand decreases, the producer can benefit from 
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w wmQ dw Fdw mQ F dG
G G
∂ ∂ 
+ = + ∂ ∂    
To choose the optimal service price, the additional revenue from asking higher price 
must exactly cover the additional costs, hence,   
S S
S S
Q Q w wQ G dG wm dG mQ F dG
G G G G
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
+ = + +  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
which is just the first-order condition for service price. 
If service worker's wage is constant, the first-order condition for service price will boil 
down to, 
0S SS




∂ ∂  
It is just the first-order condition for a textbook example of the monopoly. Our model 
is distinguished by including a general equilibrium effect of service price on service 
wage. If this effect is negligible, the second-order condition requires that the derivative 
of additional revenue be less than the derivative of extra costs. 
We also rearrange the first-order condition for quality, 
S S
S
Q Q w w dFG wm mQ F w
q q q q dq
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− = + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
The intuition is straightforward. If the producer raises service quality, the aggregate 
service demand will also increase. Therefore, at current service price, the revenue will 






=  ∂   
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. As a response to service wage change, the labor cost will change by, 
S S
w wmQ dw Fdw mQ F dq
q q
 ∂ ∂
+ = + ∂ ∂   
To choose the optimal quality, the additional revenue from raising service quality must 
exactly cover the additional costs,  
S
S
Q dF w wG dq w dq mQ F dq
q dq q q
   ∂ ∂ ∂
= + +   ∂ ∂ ∂     
It is just the first-order condition for service quality. If the general effect of service 
quality on service wage is negligible, the second-order condition requires that the 
derivative of additional revenue be less than the derivative of additional costs. 
 
In sum, the equilibrium conditions are following: 
(i) Workers with skill 1b b>  produce traded goods and live in the area [ ]10, x ; workers 
with skill 2b b<  produce non-traded services and live in the area [ ]1 2,x x ; workers 
with skill 2 1b b b< <  produce traded goods and live in the area [ ]2 3,x x . 
(ii) ( )hP x  and ( )b x  satisfy (4-18) to (4-21) for [ ]10,x x∈ ; 
(iii) ( )hP x  satisfies (4-28) for [ ]1 2,x x x∈ ; 
(iv) ( )hP x  and ( )b x  satisfy (4-38) to (4-41) for [ ]2 3,x x x∈ ; 
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(v) The marginal worker of skill 1b  is indifferent between location 1x  and 2x , (4-44) 
is satisfied; 
(vi) The marginal worker of skill 2b  is indifferent between employment sectors, (4-46) 
is satisfied; 
(vii ) Non-traded service market clears, (4-50) is satisfied; 
(viii) Land market clear, (4-51) is satisfied; 
(ix) Service producer optimizes in choosing G and q, (4-51) and (4-51) are satisfied. 
4.5 Existence of Equilibrium 
In this section, we demonstrate that equilibrium exists by construction. Our idea is to 
show that economy will converge to equilibrium from an arbitrary initial state.  
Consider a state of economy that violates equilibrium condition, such that traded 
workers with skill 1b  gain higher utility by living at location 1x  than location 2x . It 
must be true that the workers with skill marginally lower than 1b  also find it beneficial 
to move from suburban area to central area. This movement will continue, until the 
increased congestion in central area neutralizes the utility gains. Consider another state 
that service workers are worse off than traded worker with skill 2b . The service workers 
with skill marginally lower than 2b  will convert to produce traded goods, inducing a 
decreasing population of service workers. If service goods are undersupplied, service 
firm must pay higher wage w to attract sufficient amount of workers. To search for 




4.6 The Baseline Case 
Based on our algorithm, we numerically solve the general equilibrium of our economy. 
We present the baseline case in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1: General Equilibrium of the Consumer City 
Key features Values 
Skill cutoff 1b  12.7460 
Skill cutoff 2b  1.4053 
Service worker wage w  1.5594 
Employment share of non-traded service 
workers 0.3438 
Boundary of central city 1x  0.1659 
Boundary of suburb area 2x  0.7224 
Boundary of city 3x  4.2500 
Service price G 9.9601 
Service quality q  1.6806 
Expenditure share of traded goods 0.2815 
Expenditure share of housing goods 0.1515 
Expenditure share of non-traded services 0.5322 
Notes: The model parameters are 10,N = 0.35,a = 0.4,b = 0.4,e =  0.5,m =
0.5,k = 0.1,t = 0.1m = , 1,d = 1.1,z = 0.3,cR = 0.3,agrR =  and 1,b =  30.6,b =  
1.2x =  (which gives a skill Gini coefficient of 0.45). 
 
In equilibrium, the high-skill traded-sector workers with skill greater than 12.75 live in 
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the central city. Boundary of the central city is at the location of 0.17. The middle-skill 
traded-sector workers with skill ranging from 1.41 to 12.75 live in the suburban region. 
The suburban region ranges from 0.72 to 4.25 of distance to the CCD. The workers 
with skill lower than 1.41 choose to produce non-traded services. Their residential 
locations range from 0.17 to 0.72 of distance to the CCD. 
 
The service workers take up 34 percentage of total population in the city. Moretti 
(2010a) finds that for each additional job in manufacturing sector in a given city, 1.6 
jobs are created in the nontradable sector in the same city and one additional skilled job 
in the tradable sector generates 2.5 jobs in local goods and services. These findings 
suggest the proportion of service workers should be around 60 to 70 percentage. But, 
since we ignore the service employments related to housing production in our model, it 
is reasonable that the proportion of service workers at equilibrium is below the level 
implied by Moretti (2010a). In equilibrium, the spending on non-traded services takes 
up 53 percentage of total expenditure. 
 
The results of our model are consistent with many stylized facts. First, moving from the 
city center to suburbs, the income of the residents initially decreases and then increases, 
as shown in Figure 4-3. Similar to our finding, a U-shaped income curve is documented 
in superstar cities, including New York, Chicago and Philadelphia (Glaeser et al., 2008). 
Second, the bid rent curve of housing price and land price are both downward sloping, 
as shown in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4. Third, capital-to-land ratio is also downward 
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sloping from CCD to suburbs, as shown in Figure 4-5. Because the land price is higher 
at city center, housing producer will substitute capital for land. This is consistent with 
our observation that buildings are usually higher at city center. 
 
Figure 4-2: Income of residents and distance to the CCD 
 



















Figure 4-4: Land price and distance to the CCD 
 
Figure 4-5: Capital-to-land ratio and distance to the CCD 
4.7 Counterfactual Analysis 
In past decades, economic wealth has become increasingly concentrated within a small 
group of wealthy Americans (Piketty, Goldhammer, & Ganser, 2014). In this section, 
we conduct a counterfactual analysis to understand the effects of increasing skill 
















We refer to 2014 American Community Survey to choose a reasonable range of Gini 
coefficients for our counterfactual analysis. According to the survey data, the Gini 
coefficient is about 0.45 on average for the whole country. But, the degree of inequality 
can be much higher in some large cities. For example, the Gini coefficient is about 0.55 
in New York and Los Angles. Accordingly, we increase Gini coefficient from 0.45 to 
0.55, by raising upper bound of skill distribution from around 30 to 150. 
4.7.1 Transition of economic structure 
The rising income inequality has profound implications for economic structural of the 
city. In general, as skill distribution becomes more dispersed, the city will convert to an 
economy that is oriented by the non-traded service sector. The structural transition is 
reflected in many aspects, including producer's choice for service quality, the 
composition of employments and consumers' spending pattern. 
 
First, the quality of non-traded services will become more appealing to residents. As 
the Gini coefficient increases, there will be more high-income traded-sector workers in 
the city. Because non-traded services are luxury goods, the larger group of high-income 
residents will necessarily lead to a higher demand for non-traded services, as shown in 
Figure 4-7. Since a larger market can sustain a higher fixed cost, service producer will 
find it profitable to improve the quality of services. Hence, as Gini coefficient increases 





Figure 4-6: Service quality over skill Gini coefficient 
 





















Figure 4-8: Service worker wage over skill Gini coefficient 
 
Figure 4-9: Skill cutoff for service employments over skill Gini coefficient 
 
Second, there will be a greater proportion of workers employed in the service sector. 
Because the larger group of high-income consumers induce an increase in aggregate 
demand for services, service firm must offer a higher wage to attract more workers, as 
shown in Figure 4-8. Some traded-sector workers with relatively lower skill will 

















shown in Figure 4-9. As a result, the total population of service workers increases from 
3.44 to 3.72 and the share of service workers in city increases from around 34.39 
percentage to 37.23 percentage, as shown in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11. 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Population by occupations over skill Gini coefficient 
 
Figure 4-11: Share of service employments over skill Gini coefficient 
Third, the structural transition of the economy is also apparent from changes in 





















share of spending on services increases from 53.22 percentage to 57.97 percentage, as 
shown in Figure 4-12, while the expenditure share of traded goods and housing goods 
both decrease. 
 
Figure 4-12: Expenditure shares over skill Gini coefficient 
4.7.2 Changes of urban structure 
The increasing skill dispersion not only leads to the economic transition of the city but 
also has an impact on the urban structure. First, the city will become larger in physical 
size. As shown in Figure 4-15, city boundary 3x  expands from 4.25 to 4.88, because 
higher aggregate income at city level drives up total housing demand. Similarly, the 
physical size of the central city 1x  also increases from around 0.17 to 0.25, as shown 













Figure 4-13: Boundary of central city over skill Gini coefficient 
 



























Figure 4-15: Boundary of city over skill Gini coefficient 
 
Figure 4-16: Cumulative population over distance to the CCD: Gini 


























Figure 4-17: Housing price over distance to the CCD: Gini 
coefficient=0.45 vs. Gini coefficient=0.55 
 
Figure 4-18: Land price over distance to the CCD: Gini 













Figure 4-19: Capital-to-land ratio over distance to the CCD: Gini 
coefficient=0.45 vs. Gini coefficient=0.55 
 
Second, the bid rent curves of housing price and land price both shift upward, as shown 
in Figure 4-17 and Figure 4-18. In particular, housing price at city center increases from 
1.33 to 1.38. Because land is more expensive, the housing producer will substitute 
capital for land, as shown by the shift up of capital-to-land ratio in Figure 4-19. In 
addition, as more high-income traded-sector workers live in the central city, the 
competition for the housing at central location becomes more intensive. As a result, the 
bid rent curve of housing price becomes steeper at city center. The absolute value of 
the housing price slope at city center increases from 0.83 to 1.37, as shown in Figure 
4-20. The prediction is consistent with the stylized fact that housing price premium at 












Figure 4-20: Housing price slope over distance to the CCD: Gini 
coefficient=0.45 vs. Gini coefficient=0.55  
 
Third, the traded-sector workers with relatively lower skill are bid out from the central 
location, because of a more intensive competition for housing near the CCD. As Gini 
coefficient increases from 0.45 to 0.55, the skill cutoff 1b  increases from 12.75 to 17.57 
(Figure 4-21). Because housing is more expensive at the central location, a traded 
worker has to be more skilled to find it desirable to live at the central location. Even for 
the traded-sector workers that stay in the central city, they are forced to live further 
from the CCD, as shown in Figure 4-22, because the high-skill traded-sector workers 
bid up housing price and occupy a greater amount of land. In general, our model 
predicts that, as skill distribution becomes more dispersed, city center will be 












Figure 4-21: Skill cutoff for central-city residents over skill Gini 
coefficient 
 
Figure 4-22: Income of residents (in log) over distance to the CCD: 
Gini coefficient=0.45 vs. Gini coefficient=0.55 
4.7.3 Effect of different fundamentals 
We further explore the effects of housing supply elasticity, service production 
technology and transportation costs on economic structure and land use of the city. We 



















from 0.6 to 0.3. Second, we reduce commuting cost for service workers by decreasing 
τ  from 0.1 to 0.05. Third, we reduce the travel cost for service consumers by 
decreasing k  from 0.5 to 0.3. Last, we reduce the fixed cost that is associated with 
service quality by reducing δ  from 1 to 0.5. We present our results in Table 4-2 and 
column one is our baseline scenario. Each cell displays two numbers, corresponding to 
the outcome associated with a skill Gini coefficient of 0.45 (top number) and a skill 
Gini coefficient of 0.55 (bottom number), respectively. Column 2 to 5 show the 
simulation results for the alternative scenarios. 
 
Our main results remain robust in a wide range of parameters. Besides, we could draw 
additional implications for skill sorting and urban land use of the city. When housing 
supply is more elastic, the physical size of the city will shrink in all dimensions 
including the sizes of the central city, suburb region, and service workers' residential 
region. Because the service workers can live closer to their workplace and save on 
commuting cost, the wage premium received by the service workers also becomes 
lower. More traded-sector workers will find it desirable to live in the central city, as 
indicated by the lower skill cutoff 1b . The aggregate demand for services also increases. 
Because housing supply is more elastic, the city center will lose its attractiveness 
relative to other locations in the central city. Hence, the slope of the housing bid rent 
becomes flatter at city center. 
 
As commuting cost decreases, the service workers will lose their incentives to compete 
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for the central location with the high-income traded-sector workers. Hence, the housing 
price and land price at city center become lower, and the housing price slope at city 
center also becomes flatter. With less incentive to save commuting costs, the service 
workers are willing to live further from city center, as indicated by rising 1x . The 
moving out of service workers allows the traded-sector workers to move from suburb 
region to central city, indicated by lower 1b . As a result, the suburb region occupies 
less land, but the central city expands. Besides, when the commuting cost is lower, the 
service firm will pay a lower wage premium to its employees. 
 
When the travel cost for service purchases becomes lower, the high-skill traded-sector 
workers will have less incentive to bid for the central location. Hence, the housing price 
and land price at city center both become lower and the housing price slope at city 
center also becomes flatter. With lower willingness to pay for the central location, a 
proportion of traded-sector workers will move from central city to suburb region, as 
indicated by rising 1b . As a result, the central city will shrink in physical size, as shown 
by lower 1x , while the suburb area will expand. 
 
Table 4-2: Comparative Static Analysis: the Consumer City 
 Baseline μ =0.3 τ =0.05 k =0.3 δ =0.5 
























Boundary of central city, 1x  




0.5564   
0.6596 
0.0097   
0.1313 
0.1027   
0.1835 
Inner boundary of suburbs, 2x  
0.7224   
0.9461 
0.4183   
0.5468 
1.3250   
1.6020 
0.6248   
0.8982 
0.5449   
0.7324 
City boundary, 3x  




4.3306   
5.0028 
4.9309   
5.5940 
3.6879   
4.2122 
Physical size of suburbs, 3 2x x−  
3.5276   
3.9383 
2.0139   
2.2503 
3.0056   
3.4008 
4.3060   
4.6958 
3.1430   
3.4798 
Physical size of service worker 
region, 2 1x x−  
0.5564   
0.6947 
0.3195   
0.3985 
0.7686   
0.9423 
0.6151   
0.7669 
0.4422   
0.5489 
Housing price at CCD 1.3318   1.3765 
0.8989   
0.9167 
1.2538   
1.2946 
1.1675   
1.2045 
1.3092   
1.3517 
Land price at CCD 0.1330   0.1421 
0.0274   
0.0293 
0.1179   
0.1257 
0.1022   
0.1088 
0.1285   
0.1370 





-0.4261   
-0.7074 
-0.8322   
-1.3802 
Price of non-traded services, G  9.9601   12.5296 
9.8321   
12.3153 
9.9161   
12.4760 




Quality of service goods, q  1.6806   1.8004 
1.6536   
1.7739 
1.6869   
1.8083 
1.6614   
1.7790 
3.0285   
3.2398 
Wage of service workers, w  1.5594   1.6477 








Service wage premium, 2w b−  
0.1541   
0.1819 
0.0901   
0.1063 
0.1127   
0.1311 
0.1463   
0.1757 
0.1236   
0.1461 
Aggregate demand for service goods 1.6686   1.8134 
1.7409   
1.8890 
1.6749   
1.8194 
1.6528   
1.8014 
1.5985   
1.7341 
Proportion of service workers in 
economy 
0.3439   
0.3723 
0.3480   
0.3768 
0.3452   
0.3738 
0.3401   
0.3686 
0.3290   
0.3556 
Expenditure share of non-traded 
service 
0.5322   
0.5797 
0.5515   
0.5973 
0.5342   
0.5818 
0.5381   
0.5851 
0.5922   
0.6349 
Utility of workers at different skill 
levels      
Skill=1 3.8598   3.8568 
3.8859   
3.8818 
3.8614   
3.8585 
3.8622   
3.8589 




Skill=2 4.0594   4.0235 
4.0878   
4.0498 
4.0604   
4.0244 
4.0656   
4.0293 
4.2113   
4.1624 
Skill=5 4.7496   4.6699 
4.7878   
4.7072 
4.7516   
4.6717 
4.7539   
4.6756 
5.0440   
4.9465 
Skill=10 5.4807   5.3538 
5.5242   
5.3982 
5.4924   
5.3616 
5.4797   
5.3561 
5.9225   
5.7729 
Skill=30 7.1747   6.9339 
7.2190   
6.9862 
7.1951   
6.9545 
7.1448   
6.9165 
7.9465   
7.6726 
Notes: parameters are same as in Table 1 
4.8 Welfare Distribution 
The increasing skill dispersion will affect the welfare of heterogeneous workers in 
different ways. The welfare impact of higher skill dispersion is in three folds. First, the 
larger group of high-income workers will raise the quality of service, offering a positive 
spillover effect on the other workers. Second, the larger group of high-income workers 
will raise the wage for service workers. Third, although these high-income newcomers 
can benefit the others through non-traded service market, they will put other workers 
in a worse situation on the housing market. They impose a negative spillover effect on 
other residents by bidding away central location and forcing the others to pay higher 
housing price and travel costs. 
 
We present utility of workers by skill groups in Figure 4-23 to Figure 4-27. Besides, 
we also calculate the relative change in welfare across skill spectrum and show it in 
Figure 4-28. In general, we find that the high-skill traded-sector workers will suffer the 




Because of the negative spillover effect, all workers experience welfare loss. But, the 
low-skill worker suffers relatively less, as shown in Figure 4-28. It is because the 
positive spillover effect through rising wage is so strong that it partially covers the 
negative spillover effect through higher housing price. The traded-sector workers with 
relatively lower skill will suffer more from rising skill dispersion in an early stage, but 
as soon as they switch to produce non-traded services, they will be compensated by a 
higher wage. As an example, we analyze utility change of the worker with the skill of 
1.43 (Figure 4-24). Initially, the worker produces traded goods and experiences a 
dramatic welfare loss from rising Gini coefficient. Yet, as Gini coefficient rises to 
around 0.49, the worker switches to produce non-traded services. Furthermore, as Gini 
coefficient rises from 0.49 to 0.55, the worker's welfare decreases at a much slower 
pace, because she receives a compensation through rising wage.  
 
Next, we explore the welfare implications of housing supply elasticity and travel cost. 
We compare the relative change of utility in baseline and that in an alternative scenario. 
In general, changes in fundamental factors will rotate the curve of relative change of 
utility. Welfare benefits for high-skill traded-sector workers always mirror a welfare 
loss for the middle- and low-skill workers, vice versa. 
 
When housing supply is more elastic, high-skill traded-sector workers will suffer 
relatively less from increasing skill dispersion, as opposed to the scenario that housing 
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supply is inelastic, shown in Figure 4-29. When housing supply is more elastic, the 
central city could hold a greater amount of high-skill workers; hence, the negative 
spillover through housing market becomes weaker.  
 
When travel cost for service consumers is lower, the high-skill traded-sector workers 
also suffer relatively less from increasing skill dispersion, as shown in Figure 4-30. The 
result is consistent with our expectation. Because the high-skill traded worker spends a 
greater proportion of their income on service goods, their welfare should be more 
sensitive to the change of travel costs. 
 
 































Figure 4-25: Utility of workers at skill level 5 over skill Gini coefficient 
 






























Figure 4-27: Utility of workers at skill level 30 over skill Gini coefficient 
 




























Figure 4-29: Relative change in utility by skill groups: mu=0.5 vs. mu=0.3 
 
 
Figure 4-30: Relative change in utility by skill groups: k=0.5 vs. k=0.3 
4.9 Efficiency of the Consumer City: Counterfactual 
Analysis with Marginal-cost Pricing 
When the city maximizes the aggregate commercial land rent in the CCD, the non-





















commercial land rent in the CCD is associated with a deadweight loss. Hence, we 
consider an alternative scenario that non-traded service is priced at the marginal 
production costs. We present the key results in Table 4-3. The baseline is given in 
column 1 and the marginal-cost pricing regime in column 2. To make them comparable, 
we assume that service quality is constant in two regimes. 
 
Our results show that marginal-cost pricing favors the rise of "consumer city". When 
non-traded service becomes cheaper, consumers will substitute non-traded service for 
housing. Consumers will spend a higher share of their income on non-traded services. 
Driven by the increasing demand for services, a greater proportion of city employments 
will produce non-traded services. 
 
When non-traded services are priced at marginal production costs, the consumer city 
will become more compact. The city boundary will shrink and the size of the internal 
city will also decrease. Hence, population density in the city will be higher, as shown 
in Figure 4-32. When non-traded service becomes cheaper, the central city will be made 
more attractive. Middle-skill traded-sector workers will move from suburban region to 
central city, as indicated by higher 1b . The benefits from improved consumption 
amenities are partially capitalized in housing price. Housing price in central city 
increases dramatically and housing price gradient at city center also becomes steeper, 




Table 4-3: Comparison between Two Pricing Regimes 
 The baseline Marginal-cost pricing 
Service price/ marginal production 
cost 6.3870 1.0000 
Skill cutoff, 1b  12.7460 8.7009 
Skill cutoff, 2b  1.4053 5.0978 
Boundary of central city, 1x  0.1659 0.0728 
City boundary, 3x  4.2500 2.1581 
Housing price at CCD 1.3318 2.3666 
Housing price slope at CCD -0.8299 -3.1995 
Wage of service workers, w  1.5594 5.2785 
Aggregate demand for service goods 1.6686 6.9836 
Share of service workers in economy 0.3439 0.8754 
Expenditure share of non-traded 
services 0.5322 0.6543 
Total surplus 12.3470 30.3388 
Notes: parameters are same as in Table 1.  
 
Given the equilibrium prices in the marginal-cost pricing regime, we calculate 
"compensating income" for each individual that allow them to attain the level of utility 
as in the baseline scenario. Then, we compare the compensating income with the 
127 
 
income received by the individual in the marginal-cost pricing regime. When the latter 
is higher, the individual experiences welfare gains, vice versa. For each skill group, we 
calculate worker's "willingness to pay" that is defined as the actual income minus the 
compensating income. We present our results in Figure 4-34. 
 
In the marginal-cost pricing regime, all workers enjoy welfare gains, as shown by 
positive willingness to pay across skill groups. The willingness to pay of middle-skill 
workers are lower than that of high-skill and low-skill workers. It is because the middle-
skill workers do not experience a wage growth, as it happens to the low-skill service 
workers, and they are poorer than the high-skill workers, thus constrained in their 
budget in taking advantage of the lower service price. 
 
Also, we calculate the total surplus in the marginal-cost pricing regime that is defined 
as the sum of incremental land rent and aggregate willingness to pay minus the fixed 
cost in the service sector. Then, we compare it with the total surplus in the baseline that 
is defined as the sum of incremental land rent and service producer's profit. We find the 
former is much higher, hence showing that the deadweight loss associated with 
maximizing commercial land rent is significant (Table 4-3). 
 
Our model implies that the marginal production costs and the fixed costs of non-traded 
service sector should be financed separately. While the marginal production costs 
should be covered by service price, the fixed cost charged on the service producer 
128 
 
should be subsidized by the government. The policy implication is even more relevant 
for the Chinese cities where the high urban land rent dramatically drives up the fixed 
costs in the non-traded service sector. Our analysis implies that Chinese governments 
should subsidize the high commercial land rent that is charged on non-traded service 
producers, to accelerate the structural transition of the economy. By adopting the policy, 
the government will not only encourage the switch of employments from the traded 
sector to the non-traded service sector but also correct the distortion in resource 
allocation and improve social welfare. 
 
 
Figure 4-31: Housing price over distance to the CCD: maximizing 










Figure 4-32: Cumulative population over distance to the CCD: 
maximizing commercial land rent vs. marginal-cost pricing 
 
 
Figure 4-33: Housing price slope over distance to the CCD: 





























Figure 4-34: Willingness to pay by skill groups 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
As the service sector takes up greater share of the US economy, it is important to 
understand its implications for the cities. In this thesis, we explore a few research 
questions associated with consumer cities. Different from most of previous studies that 
examine the concept of "manufacturing cities", we emphasize the cities as consumption 
centers where people can enjoy the diversity of local services. 
 
We contribute to the literature on skill sorting, by providing a consumption-based 
theory of skill sorting across cities. While most of previous studies argue that skill 
sorting can be driven by agglomeration benefits in traded sector, our study shows that 
it can also be a result of consumer's desire to enjoy more varieties of non-traded services. 
Also, our studies can provide important implications for welfare inequality. The 
presence of the high-skill workers in the economy can benefit the low-skill through 
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raising the wage in service sector, but it may not benefit the middle-skill workers.  
 
Our studies also contribute to the literature on urban land use. While previous studies 
have done an excellent job in examining the functions of cities as manufacturing centers, 
few of them explores the internal structure of a city that serves as a consumption center 
for local services. We fill this research cap in the literature, by examining internal 
structure of a consumer city where people cluster to share the externalities in non-traded 
service sector. Also, we examine efficiency of resource allocation in a consumer city. 
 
The researches on the topic of consumer cities are far from sufficient. Even though we 
abstract from the agglomeration economics in traded sector in this thesis, it will be 
interesting to construct a more general framework to understand the interactions 
between the increasing returns in traded sector and non-traded sector. Also, it will be 
interesting to embed the monocentric consumer city model in a broader framework that 




5 Conclusion of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of two studies that focus on consumer cities. In the first study, we 
present a model to show that asymmetric spatial equilibrium can emerge from 
symmetric locations in the presence of increasing returns in local consumer amenities 
and non-homothetic preferences for such amenities. In the model, the workers are fully 
mobile across cities and their location choices determine the skill distribution in each 
city endogenously. 
 
The model can account for widened housing price dispersion across cities solely by 
increased aggregate skill inequality in the economy. A larger share of high-skill workers 
reinforces the increasing returns in local consumer amenities and income segregation 
among traded-sector workers across cities. The model also clarifies the effect of local 
housing supply elasticity on asymmetric equilibrium outcome: restrictive housing 
supply may make the “superstar” city more exclusive but would moderate, rather than 
exacerbate, housing price dispersion across cities when aggregate skill inequality rises. 
This clarification has important policy implications—expanding housing supply in a 
“superstar” city can have unintended consequence of reinforcing its advantage in local 
consumer amenities and hence its high housing price.  
 
More importantly, our model builds on a micro foundation that can be calibrated to 
quantify the contribution of aggregate skill inequality to housing price dispersion 
observed in a real economy. In addition, our model can also account for the rise of the 
133 
 
employment share of non-traded service sector resulting from increased aggregate skill 
inequality, a significant feature of many economies like US. Related to the impact of 
aggregate skill inequality on employment structure, our model reveals that widening 
aggregate skill inequality can benefit low-skill workers due to increased demand for 
non-traded services, which low-skill workers generally have a comparative advantage 
in producing. Moreover, the welfare gain of the low-skill non-traded service workers is 
at the expense of high-skill traded-sector workers, who, although enjoying a greater 
variety of non-traded services in the presence of a larger share of high-skill workers in 
the economy, nevertheless have to pay higher labor cost for each variety of non-traded 
services. 
 
In the second study, we examine the internal structure and efficiency of a consumer city, 
conditional on skill distribution of the workers in the city. Traditional monocentric city 
model studies resource allocation in terms of housing and commuting in a 
“manufacturing city” setting, where all employment is in the traded sector and located 
at the city center. In this the study, we present a model to examine the urban form and 
resource allocation of a "consumer city", where agglomeration is derived by the non-
traded sector and when the size of the non-traded sector is endogenous. The consumer 
city is a club for non-traded services, where agents cluster to share the fixed cost. 
Through spatial skill sorting, heterogeneous agents reveal their preference for the non-
traded services in equilibrium and the urban form of the consumer city mimics the 




When the inequality of worker's skill becomes wider, our model predicts that the status 
of consumer city will be reinforced: service producer will improve the quality of its 
products and hire a greater proportion of total workforce; consumers will spend a larger 
percentage of their income on non-traded services. We also highlight that better public 
transportation system will improve the quality of life in the consumer city when it 
reduces commuting cost for low-skill workers and allow the service firms to hire those 
workers at lower wages. 
 
Our model also predicts a downward-sloping welfare change across skill spectrum. 
Because the high-skill workers will bid up housing price at the central location, all 
workers will be harmed by higher housing price in the city. But the low-skill workers 
will suffer relatively less, due to increased demand for non-traded services, which low-
skill workers have a comparative advantage in producing.  
 
One of our main goals is to examine efficiency of the consumer city. We find that 
maximizing commercial land rent in the central commercial district is associated with 
a deadweight loss, and it causes inefficiency in resource allocation--the share of 
employments in the non-traded service sector is below social optimal and dispersed 
urban form generates more frictions. Hence, we argue that government should use the 
marginal-cost pricing regime by regulating the price of services and subsidizing the 
fixed costs changed on the service producer. By adopting the marginal-cost pricing 
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regime, the government will encourage the switch of employments from traded goods 
sector to the non-traded service sector. Also, as consumption amenities are improved, 
the urban form will become more compact, hence, associated with fewer urban frictions. 
 
In the future work, we will examine the implications of plain geography for the urban 
form and resource allocation efficiency of a consumer city. Also, it will be interesting 
to embed the monocentric consumer city model in the model of skill sorting across 





Adamson, D. W., Clark, D. E., & Partridge, M. D. (2004). Do Urban Agglomeration Effects and 
Household Amenities have a Skill Bias? Journal of Regional Science, 44(2), 201-224.  
Albouy, D. (2008). Are Big Cities Bad Places to Live? Estimating Quality of Life across Metropolitan 
Areas: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Albouy, D., Ehrlich, G., & Liu, Y. (2015). Housing Demand, Cost-of-Living Inequality, and the 
Affordability Crisis. update.  
Alonso, W. (1964a). Location and Land Use. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press. 
Alonso, W. (1964b). Location and Land Use. Toward a General Theory of Land Rent. Location and land 
use. Toward a general theory of land rent.  
Bacolod, M., Blum, B. S., & Strange, W. C. (2009). Skills in the City. Journal of Urban Economics, 
65(2), 136-153.  
Baily, M. N., & Bosworth, B. P. (2014). US Manufacturing: Understanding its Past and its Potential 
Future. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(1), 3-25.  
Baum-Snow, N., & Pavan, R. (2012). Understanding the City Size Wage Gap. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 79(1), 88-127.  
Baum-Snow, N., & Pavan, R. (2013). Inequality and City Size. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), 
1535-1548.  
Beckmann, M. J. (1976). Spatial equilibrium in the dispersed city Environment, regional science and 
interregional modeling (pp. 132-141): Springer. 
Behrens, K., Duranton, G., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2010). Productive Cities: Sorting, Selection and 
Agglomeration.  
Berry, C. R., & Glaeser, E. L. (2005). The Divergence of Human Capital Levels across Cities. Papers in 
regional science, 84(3), 407-444.  
Boppart, T. (2014). Structural change and the kaldor facts in a growth model with relative price effects 
and non-gorman preferences. Econometrica, 82(6), 2167-2196. doi: 10.3982/ecta11354 
Boppart, T. (2014). Structural change and the Kaldor facts in a growth model with relative price effects 
and non-Gorman preferences. Econometrica, 82(6), 2167–2196.  
Borukhov, E., & Hochman, O. (1977). Optimum and market equilibrium in a model of a city without a 
predetermined center. Environment and Planning A, 9(8), 849-856.  
Brueckner, J. K., & Rosenthal, S. S. (2009). Gentrification and neighborhood housing cycles: will 
America's future downtowns be rich? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(4), 725-743.  
Brueckner, J. K., Thisse, J.-F., & Zenou, Y. (1999). Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit poor?: 
An amenity-based theory. European Economic Review, 43(1), 91-107.  
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., & Gobillon, L. (2008). Spatial Wage Disparities: Sorting Matters! Journal 
of Urban Economics, 63(2), 723-742.  
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., Gobillon, L., & Roux, S. (2012). Sorting and Local Wage and Skill 
Distributions in France. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42(6), 913-930.  
Couture, V. (2013). Valuing the Consumption Benefits of Urban Density. University of California, 
Berkeley. Processed.  




Davis, J. C., & Henderson, J. V. (2008). The Agglomeration of Headquarters. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 38(5), 445-460.  
De Bartolome, C. A., & Ross, S. L. (2003). Equilibria with local governments and commuting: income 
sorting vs income mixing. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(1), 1-20.  
Edlund, L., Machado, C., & Sviatchi, M. (2015). Bright minds, big rent: gentrification and the rising 
returns to skill: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Eeckhout, J., Pinheiro, R., & Schmidheiny, K. (2010). Spatial Sorting: Why New York, Los Angeles and 
Detroit Attract the Greatest Minds as well as the Unskilled.  
Eeckhout, J., Pinheiro, R., & Schmidheiny, K. (2014). Spatial sorting. Journal of Political Economy, 
122(3), 554-620.  
Ehrenhalt, A. (2012). The great inversion and the future of the American city: Alfred a Knopf 
Incorporated. 
Fu, Y., & Liao, W.-C. (2012). What Drive the Geographic Concentration of College Graduates in the US? 
Evidence from Internal Migration: Working paper. 
Fu, Y., & Liao, W.-C. (2014). What Drive the Geographic Concentration of College Graduates in the US? 
Evidence from Internal Migration. Working Paper.  
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. R., & Venables, A. J. (2001). The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and 
International Trade: MIT press. 
Fujita, M., & Ogawa, H. (1982). Multiple equilibria and structural transition of non-monocentric urban 
configurations. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 12(2), 161-196.  
Fujita, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (2013). Economics of agglomeration: cities, industrial location, and 
globalization: Cambridge university press. 
Giannetti, M. (2001). Skill Complementarities and Migration Decisions. Labour, 15(1), 1-31.  
Giannetti, M. (2003). On the Mechanics of Migration Decisions: Skill Complementarities and 
Endogenous Price Differentials. Journal of Development Economics, 71(2), 329-349.  
Glaeser, E. L., Kahn, M. E., & Rappaport, J. (2008). Why do the Poor Live in Cities? The Role of Public 
Transportation. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(1), 1-24. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2006.12.004 
Glaeser, E. L., Kolko, J., & Saiz, A. (2001). Consumer City. Journal of economic geography, 1(1), 27-
50.  
Glaeser, E. L., & Resseger, M. G. (2010). The Complementarity between Cities and Skills. Journal of 
Regional Science, 50(1), 221-244.  
Gottlieb, J. D., & Glaeser, E. L. (2006). Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City. Urban Studies, 43(8), 
1275-1299.  
Gyourko, J., Mayer, C., & Sinai, T. (2013). Superstar Cities. American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy, 5(4), 167-199.  
Handbury, J. (2013). Are poor cities cheap for everyone? non-homotheticity and the cost of living across 
us cities. Non-Homotheticity and the Cost of Living Across US Cities (June 21, 2013). The 
Wharton School Research Paper(71).  
Handbury, J., & Weinstein, D. E. (2012). Is New Economic Geography Right? Evidence from Price Data: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Helsley, R. W., & Strange, W. C. (2007). Urban interactions and spatial structure. Journal of economic 
geography, 7(2), 119-138.  
Helsley, R. W., & Zenou, Y. (2014). Social networks and interactions in cities. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 150, 426-466.  
138 
 
Henderson, J. V. (1974). Sizes and Types of Cities. American Economic Review, 64(4), 640-656.  
Hendricks, L. (2011). The Skill Composition of U.S. Cities. International Economic Review, 52(1), 1-32.  
Hilber, C. A. L., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2013). On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and 
Evidence from US Metro Areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 75, 29-43. doi: 
10.1016/j.jue.2012.10.002 
Holian, M. J., & Kahn, M. E. (2013). The rise of the low carbon consumer city: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Jacobs, J. (1970). The Economy of Cities. The economy of cities.  
Kaplanis, I. (2010a). Local Human Capital and its Impact on Local Employment Chances in Britain.  
Kaplanis, I. (2010b). Wage effects from changes in local human capital in Britain.  
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing Returns and Economic-Geography. Journal of Political Economy, 99(3), 
483-499. doi: 10.1086/261763 
Lee, D., & Wolpin, K. I. (2006). Intersectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service sector. 
Econometrica, 74(1), 1-46.  
Lee, S. (2010). Ability Sorting and Consumer City. Journal of Urban Economics, 68(1), 20-33.  
LeRoy, S. F., & Sonstelie, J. (1983). Paradise lost and regained: Transportation innovation, income, and 
residential location. Journal of Urban Economics, 13(1), 67-89.  
Lester, T. W., & Hartley, D. A. (2014). The long term employment impacts of gentrification in the 1990s. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 45, 80-89.  
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of monetary economics, 
22(1), 3-42.  
Lucas, R. E., & Rossi–Hansberg, E. (2002). On the internal structure of cities. Econometrica, 70(4), 
1445-1476.  
Manning, A. (2004). We Can Work It Out: The Impact of Technological Change on the Demand for 
Low‐Skill Workers. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 51(5), 581-608.  
Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. 
Matano, A., & Naticchioni, P. (2012). Wage Distribution and the Spatial Sorting of Workers. Journal of 
economic geography, 12(2), 379-408.  
Mills, E. S. (1967). An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area. The American 
Economic Review, 57(2), 197-210.  
Mion, G., & Naticchioni, P. (2009). The Spatial Sorting and Matching of Skills and Firms. Canadian 
Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 42(1), 28-55.  
Moretti, E. (2010a). Local Multipliers. The American Economic Review, 100(2), 373-377.  
Moretti, E. (2010b). Local Multipliers. The American Economic Review, 373-377.  
Moretti, E. (2013). Real Wage Inequality. American Economic Journal-Applied Economics, 5(1), 65-103. 
doi: 10.1257/app.5.1.65 
Moretti, E., & Thulin, P. (2013). Local Multipliers and Human Capital in the United States and Sweden. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(1), 339-362.  
Muellbauer, J. (1975). Aggregation, income distribution and consumer demand. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 42(4), 525-543.  
Muellbauer, J. (1976). Community preferences and the representative consumer. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, 979-999.  
Muth, R. (1969). Cities and housing: The spatial patterns of urban residential land use. University of 
Chicago, Chicago, 4, 114-123.  
139 
 
Muth, R. F. (1969). Cities and Housing: University of Chicago Press. 
Ng, Y.-K., & Weisser, M. (1974). Optimal pricing with a budget constraint--The case of the two-part 
tariff. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(3), 337-345.  
Piketty, T., Goldhammer, A., & Ganser, L. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century.  
Rappaport, J. (2014). Monocentric city redux. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper(14-
09).  
Rauch, J. E. (1993). Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence 
from the Cities. Journal of Urban Economics, 34(3), 380-400.  
Rosenthal, S. S. (2008). Old homes, externalities, and poor neighborhoods. A model of urban decline and 
renewal. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(3), 816-840.  
Rosenthal, S. S. (2014). Are private markets and filtering a viable source of low-income housing? 
Estimates from a “repeat income” model. The American Economic Review, 104(2), 687-706.  
Schiff, N. (2014). Cities and product variety: evidence from restaurants. Journal of economic geography, 
lbu040.  
Schuetz, J., Kolko, J., & Meltzer, R. (2012). Are poor neighborhoods “retail deserts”? Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, 42(1), 269-285.  
Scotchmer, S. (1985). Two-tier pricing of shared facilities in a free-entry equilibrium. The Rand Journal 
of Economics, 456-472.  
Scotchmer, S. (2002). Local public goods and clubs. Handbook of public economics, 4, 1997-2042.  
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The journal of political economy, 64(5), 416-
424.  
Venables, A. J. (2011). Productivity in Cities: Self-Selection and Sorting. Journal of economic geography, 
11(2), 241-251.  
Waldfogel, J. (2008). The median voter and the median consumer: Local private goods and population 
composition. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(2), 567-582.  
Wheaton, W. C. (1974). A comparative static analysis of urban spatial structure. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 9(2), 223-237.  
Wheaton, W. C. (1977). Income and urban residence: An analysis of consumer demand for location. The 






Proof of Lemma I in Essay I 





















First, the expenditure function is homogenous of degree one in G and P. Second, the 
expenditure function must be non-decreasing in G and P. డூడ௉ and 
డூ




If and only if ቀ ூீቁ
ఌ − ߚ ቀ௉ீቁ
ఊ ≥ 0, the expenditure function is non-decreasing in G. 
 
Third, according to the integrability theorem, the utility function represents a locally 
non-satiated preference relation, if and only if the Slutsky matrix ࡴ is symmetric and 
negative semidefinite and satisfies ࡴ ∙ ࡼ = ૙, where ࡼ is the vector of prices. The 





























































































































The second eigenvalue is less or equal to zero, if and only if, 














Because ε ≥ γ , ቀ ூீቁ
ఌ − ߚ ቀ௉ீቁ
ఊ ≥ 0  is a sufficient condition for ߚ(1 − ߝ) ቀ௉ீቁ
ఊ −
(1 − ߛ) ቀ ூீቁ
ఌ ≤ 0.  
Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition I in Essay I (skill sorting of traded-sector workers) 
First, given the indirect utility function Eq (3-1) and the assumption that worker 
productivity in the traded sector is independent of location, traded-sector workers will 
always prefer living in the city with low housing price and low composite non-traded 
service price. Therefore, the city with high housing price and high composite non-
traded service price will attract no traded-sector workers and hence has no income to 
support non-traded service employment. Therefore, any equilibrium with positive 
population in both locations must have housing price differences across locations 
compensating the differences in composite non-traded service price.  
 
Second, from the indirect utility function Eq (3-1),we have,  
(A1) ∂
2V











High income and low composite non-traded service price are complementary. If there 









































then the single-crossing condition (A1) ensures that the traded-sector workers with skill
*b b> will all prefer the city with a lower composite non-traded service price and higher 
housing price.  
Q.E.D 
Proof of Proposition II in Essay I (non-traded sector employment) 
We prove this proposition in two steps: 
Step 1. City 1 pays higher wage to the workers in non-traded service sector, i.e., 
1 2w w> . 
Suppose that . Because 2 2 1w b b= < , proposition I says that non-traded 
service workers will strictly prefer city 2, and this conflicts with the condition that non-
traded service workers are indifferent between two cities. Therefore, City 1 must pay 
higher wage to the non-traded service workers to make the non-traded service workers 
indifferent between two cities. 
Step 2. City 1 must employ a larger number of non-traded service workers. 
Because City 1 pays higher wage to the workers in non-traded service sector, from 
(3-18), the price of a single service variety is higher. To maintain a lower composite 
non-traded service price, City 1 must produce a greater variety of services. Therefore, 
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City 1 must employ a larger number of non-traded service 
workers.        
Q.E.D 
Proof of Lemma I in Essay II 


























First, the expenditure function is homogenous of degree one in G and P. Second, 
the expenditure function must be non-decreasing in G and P. డூడ௉ and 
డூ
డீ are 










































∂ − γεε β
 
If and only if ቀூ௤ீ ቁ
ఌ − ߚ ቀ௉௤ீ ቁ
ఊ ≥ 0, the expenditure function is non-decreasing 
in G.  
Third, according to the integrability theorem, the utility function represents a 
locally non-satiated preference relation, if and only if the Slutsky matrix ܪ is 
symmetric and negative semidefinite and satisfies ܪ ∙ ܲ = 0, where ܲ is the 






















































Eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix are 0 and 































The second eigenvalue is less or equal to zero, if and only if, 














Because ε ≥ γ, ቀ୍୯ୋ ቁ
க − β ቀ୔୯ୋ ቁ
ஓ ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for 
β(1 − ߝ) ቀ୔୯ୋ ቁ
ஓ − (1 − ߛ) ቀ୍୯ୋ ቁ
க
≤ 0.  
Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Lemma II in Essay II (skill sorting of traded-sector workers) 
Suppose consumer's preference is represented by a utility function in a general 
form, 
( ), ,U X S H  
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Where ܺ is consumption of traded goods, ܵ is nontraded services and ܪ is 
housing goods. At each location, the housing bid rent is the highest price that 
individuals are willing to pay, subject to the constraint that such price leaves the 
individual no worse off than others of equal skill. Therefore, housing bid rent can 
be determined by solving the following optimization problem, in which 
consumers with income ܫ choose consumption bundles to maximize housing 




. . , ,
X S H h
I X S G kx
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Lagrange function of this optimization problem is, 
( ) ( )( ), ,I X S G kxL u U X S H
H
λ− − += + −
 





∂ ∂  
Calculating the derivative with respect to the worker's income, we have, 
2
2 ( )h H S
P H kS S k kS
x I I H I H IH
ε ε
∂ ∂ ∂
= − = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
If income elasticity of demand for housing ߝு is lower than income elasticity of 
demand for services ߝௌ, డ
మ௉೓
డ௫డூ < 0 ,and high-skill traded-sector workers live 




Proof of Proposition I in Essay II (spatial structure of a consumer city) 
We denote city boundary by ݔଷ and denote the skill of the least skilled traded-
sector workers by ܾଶ.  
I prove Proposition I by contradiction. Suppose the least-skilled traded-sector 
workers do not live at city boundary ݔଷ but at a location ݔ௟ < ݔଷ. According to 
the Lemma I, it must be that non-traded service workers occupy the area [ݔ௟, ݔଷ]. 
Because utility of service worker and trade worker of skill ܾଶ must be equal at 
location ݔ௟, the service worker and the traded worker of skill ܾଶ must earn 
equal net income,  
2bxw l =−τ  
Also, because of utility equalization, they consume equal amount of housing 
goods and service goods, i.e., ܳௌ,௧௥ௗ = ܳௌ,௦௘௥ and ܳ௛,௧௥ௗ = ܳ௛,௦௘௥. For service 











For the least skilled traded-sector workers, gradient of bid rent at location ݔ௟ is 












Therefore, |݃ݎܽ݀݅݁݊ݐ௦௘௥| > |݃ݎܽ݀݅݁݊ݐ௧௥ௗ|, which means that service workers 
have higher wiliness to pay for more central location and they will move closer to 
the city center. Therefore, in equilibrium, the traded worker with skill ܾଶ will live 
at city boundary. The part (i) is proved. 
Next, I prove part (ii). First, it is straight to prove that ( ) ( )GPIQGPIQ hS ,,/,,  
decreases in income I. Then, suppose city center is occupied by most-skilled traded 
worker (denoted തܾ), housing price gradient at city center is given by, 























If commuting cost ߬ → 0, service worker’s wage, ݓ → ܾଶ. Because തܾ > ܾଶ, 
തܾ > ݓ. 











Therefore, there must exists positive ߬, such that 
bser gradientgradient <  
and the most-skilled traded worker occupies city center. Further, there must 
exists a skill cutoff ܾଵ < തܾ and distance cutoff ݔଵ, ݔଶ, such that traded worker 
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with skill [ܾଵ, തܾ] live in area [0, ݔଵ] and service workers live in the area 
[ݔଵ, ݔଶ]. Part (ii) is proved. 
Then, I prove part (iii). In equilibrium, service workers must be indifferent 
between location ݔଵ and ݔଶ, 
















































Traded workers with skill ܾଵ are indifferent between location ݔଵ and ݔଶ, 























































































Rearrange the equation, 





























It is sufficient to compare ܾଵఌ and ݓఌ, 
































































































When commuting cost is only a small proportion of total income of service 
workers, ఛ௫భ௪  and 
ఛ௫మ
௪  are close to zero. Then, using first-order Taylor 
approximation, we have,  
ቀ1 − ఛ௫భ௪ ቁ
ఌ ≈ − ఌఛ௫భ௪  and ቀ1 −
ఛ௫మ
௪ ቁ
















































Substitute ܩଵ and ܩଶ using ܩଵ = ܩ + ݇ݔଵ and ܩଶ = ܩ + ݇ݔଶ, 









































Using first-order Taylor approximation, 





























































Algorithm for Searching Equilibrium  
We develop an algorithm to search for equilibrium in three steps. 
Step 1: Starting with an initial guess of { }1 2 0, , , , ,b b w R G q , we find the set of functions 
( ) ( ){ },hP x b x  that satisfy the equilibrium conditions (i) to (iv). 
Step 2: We develop four indicators to guide our search for equilibrium { }1 2 0, , ,b b w R . 
First, we compare the utility of traded worker with skill 1b  at location 1x  and 2x . If 
utility at 1x  is higher than 2x , traded worker will move to the location 1x . Hence, we 
must lower the guess for 1b  to allow more traded-sector workers to move to the central 
area, vice versa. Second, we calculate the utility of trade worker with 2b  and compare 
it with the utility of service workers. If the traded worker with skill 2b  can gain higher 
utility in the service sector, it means the service wage w  is too high, hence, we must 
lower the guess for service wage w , vice versa. Third, we calculate aggregate demand 
of services and compare it with the total output implied by service worker population. 
If there is an oversupply of services, we lower the guess for 2b  to reduce the population 
of service workers, vice versa. Last, based on the housing price at city boundary, we 
calculate the land price at city boundary and compare it with agriculture land price agrR . 
If the land price at city boundary is higher than agrR , we lower the guess for 0R , vice 
versa. 
Step 3: Repeat Step 1 and 2, until condition (i) to (viii) are satisfied. 


















∂ , raise initial guess for q, vice versa. 
Step 5: Repeat Step 1 to 4, until all equilibrium conditions are satisfied.  
